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Article 
Transformative Teaching and Educational 
Fair Use After Georgia State 
BRANDON BUTLER 
The Supreme Court has said that copyright’s fair use doctrine is a 
“First Amendment safety valve” because it ensures that certain crucial 
cultural activities are not unduly burdened by copyright. While many such 
activities (criticism, commentary, parody) have benefited from the courts’ 
increased attention to First Amendment values, one such activity, 
education, has been mired for years in a minimalist, market-based vision 
of fair use that is largely out of touch with mainstream fair use 
jurisprudence. The latest installment in the history of educational fair use, 
the 11th Circuit’s opinion in the Georgia State University e-reserves case, 
may be the last judicial word on the subject for years to come, and I argue 
that its import is primarily in its rejection of outdated guidelines and case 
law, rather than any affirmative vision of fair use, which the court 
studiously avoids. Because of the unique factual context of the case, it 
stops short of bridging the gap between educational fair use and modern 
transformative use jurisprudence. With help from recent scholarship on 
broad patterns in fair use case law, I pick up where the GSU court left off, 
describing a variety of common educational uses that are categorizable as 
transformative, and, therefore, entitled to broad deference under 
contemporary fair use doctrine. In the process, I show a way forward for 
vindicating fair use rights and First Amendment rights, by applying the 
transformative use concept at lower levels of abstraction to help practice 
communities make sense of the doctrine.   
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Transformative Teaching and Educational 
Fair Use After Georgia State 
BRANDON BUTLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 11th Circuit’s opinion in Cambridge University Press v. Patton1 is 
a landmark: the first application of the fair use doctrine to educational uses 
in the Internet era. Indeed, the opinion is the first application of the 
doctrine by a circuit court to a dispute between publishers and educators2 
(as distinct from suits against a scholar3 or third-party copy shops4) since 
the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. The case involves Georgia State 
University (GSU), which, like many universities, has a policy allowing 
teachers to share digitized excerpts of copyrighted books and journal 
articles from the GSU library with students via a secure course website.5 
No license fees are paid nor permissions sought; GSU relies on fair use.6 
With funding from the licensing body Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) 
and the trade group Association of American Publishers (AAP), three 
university presses sued GSU in 2008 alleging widespread copyright 
infringement.7 After a lengthy trial, the district court largely vindicated 
                                                                                                                          
* Practitioner-in-Residence, American University Washington College of Law. With great 
appreciation to Peter Jaszi, Jonathan Band, Rebecca Tushnet, Dave Hansen, and the participants in the 
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology’s workshop on the future of educational fair use for their 
invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to my colleagues in the WCL 
Clinical Program for their generous feedback. Thanks to Jack Vidovich for excellent research 
assistance, and to Dean Claudio Grossman for his generous support. 
1 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014) (Cambridge II). 
2 See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1171 (9th Cir. 1983) (involving a dispute between public 
school teachers regarding alleged copyright infringement through inclusion of portions of a cake 
decorating guide in a “learning activity package”). 
3 See Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
defendant’s “use[s] of the original manuscript of Blood of My Blood were permissible under the ‘fair 
use’ exception to copyright infringement”). 
4 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that third-party copy shop’s “exploitation of the copyrighted materials did not constitute fair 
use”); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(involving major publishing houses suing third-party copy shop, Kinko’s, over alleged copyright 
infringement). 
5 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1237. 
6 Id. at 1238. 
7 Id. at 1237. 
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GSU’s practices, applying a mechanical fair use analysis that favored 
GSU.8 The publishers appealed. 
I attended oral argument.9 From the very beginning the judges on the 
appellate panel raised the issue of “transformative use.” At least since the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,10 which characterized 
transformative uses as “at the heart of the fair use doctrine,”11 courts have 
shown deference to uses successfully characterized as “transformative,” 
but skepticism about most others.12 GSU counsel conceded at oral 
argument that none of their uses were transformative. Judge Vinson then 
asked whether the uses were, therefore, market substitutes for licensed use 
in the same way that printed “coursepacks” had been found to be 
substitutional in a pair of cases in the 1990s.13 GSU’s response, that the 
electronic copies lacked a table of contents and a binding, and that the uses 
were more like a library’s reserve desk than like a copy shop, did not seem 
to persuade anyone on the panel. Again and again the judges returned to 
coursepacks, and to market effect. Observers were not optimistic for 
GSU.14 
                                                                                                                          
8 See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 2012) 
(Cambridge I) (holding that “the facts of the case so clearly meet the criteria of (1) the preamble of the 
fair use factor one, (2) factor one itself, and because (3) GSU is a non-profit educational institution, 
factor one strongly favors Defendants”), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232. Judge Evans also held 
that the second factor would favor GSU whenever the work was primarily factual, which was the case 
for the majority of the uses at issue. Id. at 1227. GSU started each fair use evaluation with the first two 
factors already in its column. The third factor often favored GSU, as well, because Judge Evans held 
that any use below a certain quantitative threshold would be favored, and most GSU uses met her 
criterion. Id. at 1243 (“Excerpts which fall within these limits are decidedly small, and allowable as 
such under factor three.”). Only factor four was likely to strongly favor the publishers in a significant 
number of cases. See id. (“[W]here permissions are readily available [for use of excerpts in electronic 
format] . . . and permissions are not paid, factor four weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor.”).  
9 Oral Argument, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (notes on file with author). 
10 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
11 Id. at 579. 
12 The rise and dominance of the transformative use paradigm is discussed in detail in Part II, 
infra. For a recent, rare dissent from the transformative approach, see Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC, 
766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s adoption of the transformative 
use concept in Campbell as a “suggestion” to courts, which Judge Easterbrook declined to follow).  
13 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a third-party copy shop’s copying of scholarship and selling it as coursepacks “did not 
constitute fair use”); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (finding that Kinko’s violated the Copyright Act when it sold for-profit coursepacks, which 
included excerpts of books, to college students). Judge Vinson’s line of questioning foreshadowed a 
blistering “concurrence” that argued all of GSU’s uses should be found unfair because a copy shop 
would have paid a license to compile the excerpts into a printed compilation for sale. Cambridge II, 
769 F.3d at 1291 (Vinson, J., concurring). 
14 See, e.g., Kevin Smith, A Discouraging Day in Court for GSU, SCHOLARLY COMM. @ DUKE 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2013/11/20/a-discouraging-day-in-court-for-
gsu/ [http://perma.cc/2KPU-K8S4] (stating that the oral argument went in a “discouraging direction for 
GSU” and noting “that storm clouds might be developing in the area of academic copyright”). 
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When the appellate court finally issued its opinion eleven months later, 
it was not as hard on GSU as those of us who attended oral arguments had 
feared it might be.15 The majority agreed with the trial court that despite 
being non-transformative, the non-profit, educational character of GSU’s 
uses should favor fair use.16 They also mostly ignored the Classroom 
Guidelines and the so-called “coursepack cases” that the publishers had 
proposed as fair use yardsticks.17 These pro-education aspects of the 
opinion were offset, however, by the court’s finding that because GSU’s 
uses were not transformative,18 the market harm of GSU’s uses should be 
given “additional weight.”19  
The appellate court did not rule on the fairness of the uses at issue in 
the case. Rather, after objecting to the mechanical nature of the district 
court’s fair use analysis, specifically, Judge Evans’ arithmetic adding of 
the four statutory factors, as well as her application of a hard quantitative 
limit for the third factor (ten percent or one chapter, depending on the 
length of the book from which the excerpt was taken) and her use of a 
binary factual/fictional standard to determine the nature of the work used, 
the appellate panel remanded for a more flexible application of the doctrine 
in light of the appellate court’s various findings.20 What that application 
will look like is anyone’s guess. The factors are in apparent equipoise, with 
favored educational purpose squaring off against potentially weighty 
market harm. As the University of Minnesota’s Copyright Program 
Librarian Nancy Sims observed, “NOTHING HERE WILL HELP EVEN 
ONE TEACHER MAKE FAIR USE CALLS.”21 Nor, one might add, is the 
decision likely to help even one judge. Somehow Judge Evans will have to 
weigh the favored nature of the use against potentially substantial market 
harm to find the right outcome for each individual use.22 
Most fair use determinations come down to a competition between 
those two considerations, the user’s laudable purpose and the copyright 
                                                                                                                          
15 Judge Vinson’s concurrence gave a glimpse of how bad things could have been. While he 
concurred in the decision to reverse and remand, Judge Vinson argued that the proper fair use analysis 
would rely heavily on the coursepack cases and the Classroom Guidelines, just as the publishers had 
argued, and would find that all of GSU’s uses were per se infringement because analogous uses by 
copy shops routinely involve paying for permission. Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1284–91.  
16 Id. at 1283. 
17 Id. at 1261 (limiting the effect of the coursepack cases); id. at 1274 (rejecting the Guidelines as 
controlling the analysis under third statutory factor). For more about these phenomena and their place 
in educational fair use history, see Part III, infra. 
18 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1262. 
19 Id. at 1281. 
20 Id. at 1237. 
21 Nancy Sims (@CopyrightLibn), TWITTER (Oct. 17, 2014, 5:57 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
copyrightlibn/status/523276713514774528 [https://perma.cc/6LE2-3B54].  
22 As of this writing, the appellate court has denied the publishers’ motion for rehearing en banc, 
so the remaining paths forward are an appeal to the Supreme Court or else a new trial court opinion on 
remand. 
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holder’s market prerogative.23 Breaking the tie in a principled way involves 
recourse to a conception of the purposes and values of fair use and 
copyright. Part II of this Article tells the story of how, over the last two 
decades, the focus of most fair use decision-making in courts has shifted 
from a presumption that the market should trump, to a focus on the user’s 
justifying purposes, and finally to courts strongly favoring uses that are 
“transformative,”24 which broadly connotes use for a new, productive 
purpose. With a transformative use story in hand, even billion dollar 
companies can disdain license demands;25 without one, however, the 
market prerogative reasserts itself and even core fair use beneficiaries 
(scholars, teachers, non-profit educational institutions) face the same 
uncertainty that GSU must now face in the wake of the circuit court’s 
reversal.  
Notably, some education-related uses have already been blessed as 
transformative. For example, a group of universities was recently 
vindicated in its claim that digitizing millions of in-copyright books for a 
variety of education-related purposes constituted fair use. In Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,26 the Second Circuit found that digitizing and 
reproducing books to allow “users to ‘word search’—that is, to locate 
where specific words or phrases appear in the digitized books[,]”27 and to 
conduct text mining research was transformative and not a market 
substitute for the books.28 The HathiTrust court decisively rejected Authors 
Guild’s claims regarding lost profits, explaining that such claims are 
irrelevant where transformative uses are concerned.29 In another case 
                                                                                                                          
23 A copyright holder’s non-pecuniary interests have occasionally played a role in fair use 
outcomes, but moral objections to a defendant’s use have a censorious aspect that can as easily favor as 
disfavor fair use. Compare Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 100 (1987) (giving weight to 
estate’s wishes regarding unpublished letters), with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
585 n.18 (1994) (explaining that “being denied permission to use a work does not weigh against fair 
use” and holding that “[p]arody, like other comment and criticism, may claim fair use”).  
24 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1991) 
(defining “transformative”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 715, 734 (2011) (explaining the shift from the market-centered to the transformative use 
approach).  
25 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(determining that search engines are transformative fair use and can copy and use millions of images 
from the internet without a license).  
26 755 F.3d 87, 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2014). 
27 Id. at 97, 100. 
28 The court also found that providing digitized texts to print-disabled library users was fair use, 
though not transformative. Id. at 102–03. This holding is also revealing. For more on the continuing 
relevance of non-transformative fair uses, see Part V, infra. For an overview of the scholarly value of 
computer analysis of texts, see Kathryn Schulz, Distant Reading, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2011, at BR14. 
29 See HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 99 (“[A]ny economic ‘harm’ caused by transformative uses does 
not count because such uses, by definition, do not serve as substitutes for the original work.”). This 
analytical move—the result of a series of decisions in the Second Circuit—is a major contribution of 
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involving digitization and indexing, A.V. ex rel. Vanderheye v. iParadigms 
LLC,30 the Fourth Circuit held that large-scale, systematic copying of 
student papers to power a plagiarism detection tool was a transformative 
fair use.31 The successes in HathiTrust and iParadigms illustrate the 
potential power of the transformative use framework in the educational 
context. The GSU case does not harness that power, but it begins to close 
the door on a historically deformed application of the doctrine. 
That deformation has an origin story, which has been told before32 but 
bears a little revisiting in Part III. From the inception of the 1976 
Copyright Act, educational photocopying and its technological descendants 
have been a source of anxiety among educational publishers, who rely on 
schools and students as the core market for their prepackaged materials. 
While part of this anxiety seems to be a concern about substitutional 
copying of textbooks, workbooks, and the like, publishers and their 
licensing agents have also sought to suppress “competition” in the form of 
teachers making their own teaching resources using materials that may not 
have been originally designed for teaching use.33 By a systematic campaign 
of litigation, threats of litigation, and copyright “education,” commercial 
interests have promulgated a vision of fair use that hinges first and 
foremost on alleged lost revenue.34 This vision, which views all teaching 
uses as “coursepacks” and all coursepacks as subject to the strictures of the 
Classroom Guidelines, is dramatically out of step with contemporary fair 
use case law, particularly the concept of transformative use. 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the GSU case is a half-measure in 
the right direction. It marks the end of the Guidelines-coursepack 
paradigm, but it does not offer a useful substitute. Indeed, while the GSU 
decisions have both recognized the value of education, and minimized the 
Classroom Guidelines and the coursepack cases, they have also joined 
other courts in finding that absent a transformative use argument, the 
availability of a license for the use could still be decisive against a fair use 
claim.35 The GSU opinions have taken educators out of the frying pan, but 
                                                                                                                          
the transformative use approach, and it is discussed at greater length later in this Article. See infra Part 
II.B.  
30 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).  
31 Id. at 640. 
32 See Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy 
Freely, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 151–52 (1998) (explaining the decline of fair use protection for 
educators).  
33 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(addressing an infringement challenge by publishers to the creation of teacher-required coursepacks). 
34 See Bartow, supra note 32, at 151–52.  
35 See Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232, 1276–77 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994)) (finding that the availability of a license makes a use less 
likely to be fair); id. at 1281 (concluding that the non-transformative nature of the use makes “the threat 
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they may well throw them into the fire. Only a compelling transformative 
use argument can free teachers from license demands and the uncertainty 
of weighing their favored purpose against the publishers’ alleged market 
harm. 
In Part IV of this Article, I echo Peter Jaszi in suggesting that teachers 
can and should “catch a ride on the train that is already moving”36—
transformative use—and I give examples of how some common teaching 
uses should be understood in terms of that paradigm, rather than the 
market-subordinate vision applied to allegedly non-transformative uses in 
the GSU case. While these kinds of arguments have been made in amicus 
briefs and best practices documents, this is the first scholarly article to 
argue with specificity that teachers make a wide variety of clearly 
transformative uses. 
Finally, in Part V, I explain the continuing relevance of market failure 
arguments for non-transformative educational uses. For decades publishers 
have argued that teachers typically fail every fair use test; their uses are not 
transformative, and market options are adequate to serve educational 
needs. The truth is exactly the opposite; teaching uses are very often 
transformative, and where they are not, the market continues to fail in 
significant ways. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE USE PARADIGM 
A.  Fair Use Generally 
Fair use is an equitable, common law doctrine created by judges to 
ensure that an author’s exclusive rights do not frustrate socially beneficial 
uses (particularly, uses that advance the goals of copyright law). Its 
modern history in the United States is often traced to Judge Joseph Story’s 
opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,37 the first opinion to describe what have 
become the four statutory factors that courts consider in deciding whether a 
use is fair.38 The doctrine has roots in English common law.39 
Fair use was first codified in U.S. law as part of the Copyright Act of 
1976.40 The process that led to its codification was famously contentious 
                                                                                                                          
of market substitution . . . [more] serious,” which requires courts to give the fourth factor “additional 
weight in its overall fair use calculus”). 
36 Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Education: The Way Forward, 25 LAW & LIT. 33, 40 (2013). 
37 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
38 See id. at 348 (“[L]ook to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value 
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work.”).  
39 See Matthew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2011). 
40 Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2012)).  
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and dominated by the question of educational photocopying.41 A 
committee of educational associations advocated a blanket exemption for 
all non-profit educational copying, while publishers insisted on a case-by-
case determination.42 Educators wanted certainty, while publishers were 
concerned a blanket exception could cannibalize revenues for textbook, 
reference book, and scientific publishing.43  
Congress ultimately split the difference, preserving case-by-case 
adjudication rather than a blanket exemption, while assuring educators 
“that, under the proper circumstances of fairness, the doctrine can be 
applied to reproductions of multiple copies for members of a class.”44 
Congress also included non-profit, educational use as a favored purpose in 
the statute.45 Finally, Congress added a provision at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) 
“to provide innocent teachers and other non-profit users of copyrighted 
material with broad insulation against unwarranted liability for 
infringement.”46 Congress thus reassured educational users that their uses 
were among those that would be found fair under appropriate 
circumstances, but did little to assure them as to what exactly those 
circumstances would be. Instead, courts were instructed to continue to 
develop the doctrine in a common law mode.47 
The text of 17 U.S.C. § 107, the fair use provision of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, reads: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, 
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the 
factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
                                                                                                                          
41 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“[M]ost of the discussion of [17 U.S.C. §] 107 has 
centered around questions of classroom reproduction, particularly photocopying.”); see Robert 
Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator’s Right to Photocopy Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use, 19 
J.C. & U.L. 271, 277–80 (1993) (describing the legislative history of § 107 centered around 
photocopying for educational use). 
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 30–31 (1967).  
43 Id. at 30.  
44 Kasunic, supra note 41, at 280 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66). 
45 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66.   
46 Kasunic, supra note 41, at 280 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67). 
47 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66.  
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration 
of all the above factors.48 
The text of the statute is insufficient on its own to guide courts, 
practitioners, and policymakers looking to identify which uses are fair. 
This is clear from the text itself, which instructs courts to consider a non-
exclusive list of four factors without telling them what, exactly, the 
consideration of those factors is meant to discover, other than perhaps 
fairness in some general sense.49 On this point, Wendy Gordon and Judge 
Leval agree. Gordon has observed, “[i]t is not clear how much weight 
should be given to any one of the four factors, what additional factors 
should be considered, or whether any one of the factors is a sine qua non 
for a finding of fair use.”50 Judge Leval wrote in his opinion in Authors 
Guild v. Google, Inc.,51  
The statute’s wording . . . does not furnish standards for 
recognition of fair use. Its instruction to consider the 
“purpose and character” of the secondary use and the 
“nature” of the copyrighted work does not explain what types 
of “purpose and character” or “nature” favor a finding of fair 
use and which do not.52  
The House Report expresses a legislative intent merely to “endorse” the 
common law doctrine as it had developed in the courts, and disclaims any 
intent to “freeze” it.53  
                                                                                                                          
48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
49 For an argument that this is as it should be, see Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on 
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (“What is fair is as fact-specific and 
resistant to generalization . . . .”).  
50 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604 (1982); see also Michael J. 
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2004) 
(“[T]he facial emptiness of the statutory language means that alone, it is almost entirely useless 
analytically, except to the extent that it structures the collection of evidence that a court might think 
relevant to its decision.”); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003) (“In the end, reliance on the . . . factors to reach fair use 
decisions often seems naught but a fairy tale.”).  
51 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
52 Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). 
53 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).  
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Courts have followed the legislature in warning that fair use cannot be 
contained or reduced to any simple formula or rule of thumb. Commercial 
uses are not per se unfair,54 nor are uses of entire works.55 The four factors 
are not exhaustive.56 The uses listed in the preamble are examples of uses 
that may be fair, but not every use of those kinds will be fair.57 The good or 
bad “faith” of the user is not decisive,58 nor is the unpublished status of the 
work used.59 The factors are not to be viewed in isolation, weighed equally, 
or tallied mathematically.60 In sum, courts have largely resisted efforts to 
contain or define the fair use doctrine in ways that might, in their view, 
unduly constrain judicial discretion to deploy the doctrine flexibly based 
on the facts of future cases. These declarations of judicial independence, 
together with the facial indeterminacy of the statute, have led several 
commentators to lament the uncertainty that seems to surround the 
doctrine.61  
                                                                                                                          
54 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (“Accordingly, the mere 
fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any 
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness.”). 
55 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) (“[T]he 
fact that the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a 
finding of fair use.”). 
56 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
57 See id. at 561 (explaining the need for a case-by-case analysis). 
58 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (D. Mass. 1841) (explaining that the defendant’s use 
cannot be found fair simply because it is morally laudable); Simon J. Frankel & Matt Kellogg, Bad 
Faith and Fair Use, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 3 (2012) (“The defendant's lack of virtue does 
not tell courts anything about the value of the defendant’s use or its effect on the market, and thus 
should be immaterial to copyright’s overall goal of maintaining the desired balance between the 
author’s economic interests and the interests of society.”). 
59 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
60 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (“All are to be explored, 
and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”). 
61 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004) (stating that fair use is “the 
right to hire a lawyer”); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2007) 
(“[L]eading courts and commentators generally acknowledge that the four-factor test as interpreted 
provides very little guidance for predicting whether a particular use will be deemed fair.”); Paul 
Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433 (2008) (stating that fair use 
“endlessly fascinates us even as it defeats our every attempt to subdue it”); Leval, supra note 24, at 
1105 (“[T]hroughout the development of fair use doctrine, courts [have] failed to fashion a set of 
governing principles or values.”); Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 
596 (2008) (“[O]ur understanding of copyright is evolving into the view that any use of a copyrighted 
work that is not authorized by the copyright owner or the statute is infringement.”); Madison, supra 
note 50, at 1551 (“It is clear that the statutory text offers far less than it appears to.”); Nimmer, supra 
note 50, at 266–68 (“Other problems continue to bedevil even those who have done their homework 
completely.”).   
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B.   How Transformative Use Saved Fair Use 
Recent scholarship answers skepticism about whether fair use can be 
described or understood theoretically and belies judges’ protestations 
against cabining their common law powers. Examined in the aggregate, 
case law reveals patterns and paradigms that help make sense of fair use 
decisions. The most recent empirical look at the doctrine, Neil Netanel’s 
Making Sense of Fair Use,62 provides a narrative account of the 
development of fair use jurisprudence since 1978 that explains not only the 
currently dominant judicial interpretation of the doctrine, but also its 
seeming incoherence at earlier stages of development. Netanel contends 
that the development of fair use case law over the last three decades sees 
the rise and fall of what he calls the “market-centered paradigm,” and the 
ultimate triumph of the transformative use paradigm.63 
The market-centered paradigm is defended most trenchantly and 
compellingly in Wendy Gordon’s 1982 article Fair Use as Market Failure: 
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors.64 In it, Gordon argues that “[f]air use should be awarded to 
the defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is 
present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an 
award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the 
plaintiff copyright owner.”65 This view seemingly creates a strong 
presumption against fair use: “[a]n economic justification for depriving a 
copyright owner of his market entitlement exists only when the possibility 
of consensual bargain has broken down in some way.”66  
Elsewhere in the article, and in subsequent writing,67 Gordon is at 
pains to point out that “market failure” is a broad concept that encompasses 
more than failure to reach a deal due to prohibitive transaction costs.68 
                                                                                                                          
62 Netanel, supra note 24. 
63 Id. at 768. 
64 Gordon, supra note 50. 
65 Id. at 1614. 
66 Id. at 1615. 
67 See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs 
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 150–51 (2002) 
(clarifying the author’s approach to the concept of market failure); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 58 (1997) (“[C]ourts must be willing to recognize the most important kind of 
market failure relevant to fair use: the inability to internalize the external benefits of certain kinds of 
use.”). 
68 The other two forms of market failure that Gordon highlights are cases where a transaction 
creates positive externalities that cannot be internalized in a bargained-for exchange and situations 
where non-monetizable interests that are not factored into the bargain by the parties are at stake. See 
Gordon, supra note 50, at 1631 (suggesting courts could “investigate whether the social costs of relying 
on the market are unacceptably high”); see also Loren, supra note 67, at 6 (discussing courts’ differing 
interpretations of market failure). Loren argues persuasively that cases, where positive externalities 
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Courts nevertheless gravitated to a simplified version of Gordon’s view: if 
a would-be fair user could seek permission, and a copyright holder would 
grant permission, then the user must seek permission.69 This version of 
Gordon’s argument was cited by the dissent in Sony v. Universal70 and by 
the majority in Harper & Row v. Nation,71 and became a dominant 
framework in fair use case law for more than a decade.72  
The market-centered approach manifests itself in another important 
aspect of the fair use case law that developed after the 1976 Copyright Act: 
the idea that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. The Supreme 
Court endorsed this presumption in back-to-back fair use opinions in the 
1980s.73 This double blessing was enough to move some courts to apply 
the presumption even after the Supreme Court itself largely abandoned the 
idea in Campbell.74  
Like any dominant paradigm, the market-centered approach was 
subjected to extensive scholarly comment. Critics warned of a dystopian 
future where all transaction costs are reduced to near-zero, every 
interaction with copyrighted content is metered and paid for, and fair use 
ceases to exist.75 Others suggested the market failure approach is too 
                                                                                                                          
would not be realized in a market exchange, are “more central to the purpose of fair use and the 
constitutional purpose of copyright” than the high transaction cost scenario. Id. 
69 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that existence of a licensing market for a given use is sufficient to “negat[e] fair use”). Such a 
presumption can be a deathblow to defendants in copyright infringement lawsuits who are in a dispute 
with a known rights holder plaintiff who is in court objecting to uncompensated use. In such 
circumstances, what court could think that a defendant is somehow unable to seek permission from the 
rights holder? Furthermore, if the defendant’s only objection is to price, the logic of the market-
centered approach dictates that the use must not be that valuable, after all, and fair use does not apply.  
70 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the fair use doctrine 
can act as a form of subsidy). 
71 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1984) (noting that “economists believe the fair use exception should 
come into play only when the market fails or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero”). 
72 See Netanel, supra note 24, at 734 (“The market-centered paradigm reigned supreme for some 
two decades following its adoption in Harper & Row in 1985.”). 
73 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (“[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively 
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”); Harper 
& Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). 
74 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (“It was error for the Court 
of Appeals to conclude that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ 
rendered it presumptively unfair.”). 
75 See Loren, supra note 67, at 46 (“Acceptance of the ‘lost’ permission fees argument permits 
copyright owners to eliminate all fair uses, because fair use will be relegated to only those uses for 
which the copyright owner declines to charge.”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: 
Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 991 (2002) (“More generally, as copyrighted works have moved 
increasingly toward interactive digital distribution, the market failure approach argues for an 
increasingly reduced role for fair use.”). Others agreed that this is a natural consequence of the theory 
and found it to be a feature, not a bug. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of 
Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 581 (1998) 
(arguing that allowing copyright owners and consumers to freely contract under a fared use system may 
reveal a system more beneficial than one preempted by federal copyright law). 
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restrictive of fair use because it ignores important differences between 
copyrighted works and ordinary physical property.76 Many pointed out that 
an overly simple market centered approach led to circular arguments of the 
following form with regard to the fourth factor: finding this use to be fair 
would permit unlicensed use. Unlicensed use causes a copyright holder 
financial harm. Any use that causes financial harm cannot be fair use. 
Therefore, the court cannot find this use to be fair.77 In the realm of 
education, critics warned that a narrow market-centered approach gives too 
little credit to the social value of education78 and that reliance on markets 
would warp teaching practices and widen the gap between rich and poor 
institutions and students.79  
The courts’ application of fair use has shifted dramatically away from 
this preoccupation with markets, due in large part to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Campbell v. Acuff Rose.80 In Campbell, the Court reversed a 
series of market-driven holdings that had led the appellate court to reject 
the musical group 2 Live Crew’s fair use defense.81 Judge Leval himself 
hailed the decision as rescuing the doctrine from a dangerous detour.82 In 
addition to its careful correction of the Sony dictum that commercial uses 
are presumptively unfair,83 Campbell’s most enduring contribution to fair 
use jurisprudence has been its emphatic embrace of the “transformative 
use” paradigm.84 
Judge Pierre N. Leval, then a federal district judge for the Southern 
District of New York, first described the concept of transformative use in 
his groundbreaking article Toward a Fair Use Standard.85 Leval proposed 
a theory, grounded in the utilitarian philosophy of copyright expressed in 
the Constitution and in various Supreme Court decisions, that copyright’s 
objective is to “stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the 
intellectual enrichment of the public.”86 Judge Leval reasoned that fair use 
                                                                                                                          
76 Lunney, supra note 75, at 993. 
77 See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 896 (2007) (noting the “danger of circularity” in court reasoning when dealing with 
market effect).  
78 See Loren, supra note 67, at 33 (noting the immense benefit of non-transformative uses of 
copyrighted materials in the context of education). 
79 See Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 11 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 461, 484, 489 (2010) (explaining that the lack of clarity in copyright law provides exceptional 
challenges, especially for institutions with fewer resources).  
80 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
81 See id. at 594. 
82 See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 19 (1994) (expressing relief that Justice Souter’s opinion guided the 
fair use doctrine in the right direction). 
83 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85. 
84 See id. at 579 (stating that transformative works significantly further the goal of copyright). 
85 See Leval, supra note 24, at 1111. 
86 Id. at 1107. 
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should apply when “excessively broad protection would stifle, rather than 
advance, [that] objective.”87 Copyright can exhibit this self-defeating 
quality for two reasons: all intellectual creation has a more or less 
derivative character, and some very important intellectual activities are 
“explicitly referential.”88  
Leval argues that factor one, the purpose and character of the use, is 
the key to the fair use inquiry because it reveals whether and to what extent 
a use is justified.89 The Constitution’s utilitarian vision of copyright tells us 
those uses that contribute to the intellectual enterprise by using existing 
material for a new purpose; adding value; and creating “new information, 
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” will be justified.90 Leval 
calls such uses “transformative.”91 A transformative justification is not 
absolute or infinite; the use must be appropriately tailored to the 
justificatory purpose.92 “Factor One,” Leval writes, “is the soul of fair 
use.”93 The remaining factors are then weighed against the justificatory 
force of factor one.94 Where there is no transformative justification for the 
use and the planned use simply reproduces and exploits existing works, 
adding nothing in the process, Leval suggests further inquiry may be 
unnecessary.95 
In discussing the first factor in Campbell—the purpose and character 
of the use—Justice Souter writes that when evaluating use of an existing 
work to create a new work, judges ask whether the new work “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message; . . . in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’”96 More 
importantly, the Court adopts Leval’s view that transformative uses “lie at 
the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright,” and that therefore “the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”97 So, even 
though 2 Live Crew’s use was commercial, and even though licenses are 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 1109. 
88 Id. (providing philosophy, history, and science as examples). 
89 Id. at 1111. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1112.  
92 Id. at 1111; see also id. at 1112 (providing examples of “takings of protected expression 
without sufficient transformative justification”). 
93 Id. at 1116. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citing Leval, supra note 24, at 
1111).  
97 Id. 
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commonly paid for reuse of existing music in rap songs,98 the use could 
still be fair due to its transformative nature as parody, which quotes 
characteristic passages from a work in order to criticize and lampoon it, 
thus creating a valuable new contribution to the culture. 
Some scholars were skeptical of transformative use as applied by the 
courts in the years immediately following Campbell. Lower courts’ dutiful 
shift in rhetoric notwithstanding, it was not clear at first that there was any 
real substantive effect on the application of the law. Some suggested that 
the word was applied post hoc to whatever uses judges decided (for their 
own equitable reasons) should be found fair, with no consistent meaning 
across uses.99 In his groundbreaking empirical study of fair use case law 
from 1978–2005, Barton Beebe suggested that Campbell had caused a 
brief period of judicial focus on the user’s purpose but that, over time, 
courts drifted again toward a focus on market harm.100 
Each of these concerns has been addressed, and transformative use 
vindicated, by more recent empirical studies of fair use case law. R. 
Anthony Reese has shown that transformative use is primarily about new 
purposes, not literal alteration of underlying works,101 a distinction that 
defuses arguments that transformative use vitiates the derivative works 
right. Reese’s argument should also give comfort to scholars who worry 
that important uses that do not involve literal alteration of the original work 
are undervalued by the dominance of the transformative use paradigm.102 
Matthew Sag has shown that transformative use can be used to predict 
likely outcomes of fair use cases ex ante, refuting the alleged 
unpredictability of the doctrine.103 Michael Madison has argued, based on 
his own exhaustive reading of the case law from 1978–2003, that fair use is 
an analytical tool that focuses on social and cultural patterns,104 that courts 
can use these patterns to understand when a use is transformative,105 and 
                                                                                                                          
98 2 Live Crew had even explored the option of obtaining such a license. Id. at 573. 
99 See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem 
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 251, 259, 262 (1998). 
100 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 549, 588 (2007).  
101 See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 467, 485 (2008) (“In assessing transformativeness, the courts generally emphasize the 
transformativeness of the defendant’s purpose in using the underlying work, rather than any 
transformation (or lack thereof) by the defendant of the content of the underlying work.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
102 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004) (arguing that the focus on transformative use, 
which the author defines as speech that is “critical and creative,” is “critically incomplete, leaving 
unchallenged much of copyright’s scope, despite the large number of nontransformative copying 
activities that are also instances of free speech”). 
103 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 49, 51 (2012). 
104 See Madison, supra note 50, at 1646. 
105 See id. at 1670.  
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that social patterns organized around uncompensated uses should not be 
disfavored under the fourth factor.106 Finally, in Making Sense of Fair Use, 
Netanel has described the development and emerging coherence of the fair 
use doctrine from a chronological perspective, showing that transformative 
use has come to define the doctrine more and more in recent years, even 
when courts do not invoke the doctrine by name.107  
These studies have a cumulative, refining, and mutually reinforcing 
quality, and together they provide would-be fair users with powerful 
insights into the doctrine. Most important is Netanel’s conclusion that 
transformative use has decisively replaced inquiry into market harm as the 
dominant paradigm in fair use jurisprudence.108 Netanel demonstrates that 
when judges find the use of a copyrighted work to be transformative, they 
almost always find it to be fair.109 Using fresher data, finer-grained coding, 
and a chronological lens, Netanel rebuts some of the skeptical conclusions 
of Beebe’s earlier empirical analysis, showing that courts paid more and 
more attention to transformative use after Campbell.110 Netanel’s study 
also confirms Reese’s conclusion that transformative use does not require 
literal alteration of the underlying work.111 Indeed, Netanel finds that literal 
alteration is neither necessary nor sufficient for a finding of fair use.112 
Most fair use cases did not involve alteration of the underlying work, and, 
in the cases involving alteration, fair use was found only where the use was 
for a new purpose.113  
In addition to explaining the courts’ turn from factor four to factor one 
as the key to the fair use inquiry, these scholarly surveys have unearthed a 
series of kinds of uses that courts seem consistently to find transformative 
and, therefore, fair. Pamela Samuelson’s Unbundling Fair Uses114 teases 
out a series of “policy-relevant clusters” of related uses from the case 
law.115 Transformative use plays a significant role in several of these 
clusters, and Samuelson’s work adds a helpful nomenclature for subclasses 
of transformative uses, dividing them into three types: literally 
                                                                                                                          
106 While Madison does not characterize his theory in this way, it seems more than fair to say that 
in arguing that courts are primarily interested in a defendant’s legitimate claim to be engaged in a 
recognized social pattern, Madison is arguing that courts are looking primarily at the user’s purpose, 
rather than the alleged market harm, to determine fairness. See id. at 1668–69.  
107 See Netanel, supra note 24, at 719, 722–23.  
108 Id. at 742.  
109 See id. at 743, 745–46. 
110 Id. at 737–38. 
111 Id. at 747. 
112 See id.  
113 See id.  
114 Paula Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009). 
115 Id. at 2541. 
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transformative uses,116 productive uses,117 and orthogonal uses. In 
Samuelson’s typology, literally transformative uses are those that alter or 
recast the underlying creative work, literally transforming it, in order to 
create a new expressive work.118 The parody in Campbell is an example of 
a transformative use in this sense. The Wind Done Gone’s retelling of 
Gone with the Wind from the point of view of the non-white characters is 
another example.119  
Productive uses, in Samuelson’s sense, do not involve alteration of the 
original work; rather, the original work, or a protectable portion of that 
work, is copied without alteration in the context of criticism or 
commentary about the work.120 Samuelson gives as an example of this kind 
of fair use the work at issue in New Era Publications International v. Carol 
Publishing Group,121 a scathing biography that quoted extensively from L. 
Ron Hubbard’s published books in order to subject the books and their 
author to criticism.122 
Finally, orthogonal uses involve literal copying from an existing work 
for an entirely new purpose. Some orthogonal uses involve speech-related 
purposes,123 such as reproducing substantial portions of copyrighted works 
as evidence to support charges of bigotry,124 or distributing the entirety of 
                                                                                                                          
116 Samuelson does not use the phrase “literally transformative.” Instead, she argues that only 
parodies and other literal alterations that result in creation of a new work are “truly transformative,” 
and that other uses are better described using her concepts of “orthogonal” and “productive” uses. Id. at 
2557–58. This insistence on “true transformativeness,” however, is inconsistent with judicial use of the 
term, which has mostly followed Leval in applying the term when a use is made for a new purpose, 
even when no literal change is made to the work. See Leval, supra note 24, at 1111 (stating that a 
transformative use “must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose 
from the original” (emphasis added)). Indeed, as Netanel points out, courts are much more likely to 
treat “orthogonal” and “productive” uses as transformative than they are to treat literally transformative 
uses as such. Netanel, supra note 24, at 747. I will use “literally transformative” to describe the 
subclass of uses that Samuelson calls “transformative,” such as the parody in Campbell, which recasts 
or transforms an existing work in much the same way a derivative work might do. I will continue to use 
“transformative use” in the broader way that Leval and subsequent courts have done. 
117 “Productive use” is a term with a history in fair use case law, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that each of 
the uses in the preamble of § 107 is “a productive use, resulting in some added benefit to the public 
beyond that produced by the first author’s work”), and Samuelson’s term seems to play somewhat on 
that history, without being entirely bound by it. 
118 See Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2548–49. 
119 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001) (observing 
that defendant’s novel attempted to erase the romantic picture Gone with the Wind had painted of the 
South during and after the Civil War). 
120 Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2555–56.   
121 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).  
122 See id. at 154. 
123 See Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2557. 
124 See Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, 
at *1, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (determining that defendants’ use of plaintiff’s radio segment on website 
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an allegedly offensive work to help raise funds for a libel lawsuit against 
the work’s publisher.125 Other orthogonal uses include use in litigation and 
for other government purposes126 and use to facilitate technological access 
to information (with search engines as a paradigm case).127 
Matthew Sag has also contributed two useful sub-categories to the 
family of uses that courts have considered transformative. In Predicting 
Fair Use, Sag deploys a category he calls “creativity shift” as a heuristic to 
isolate uses that most exemplify the general concept transformativeness.128 
In coding the cases examined in his study of fair use, Sag attached the 
variable “creativity shift” “in cases where the plaintiff’s work is creative 
and the defendant’s is informational, or vice versa.”129 Sag explains, “[t]his 
shift in category should almost always entail a fundamental change in 
purpose, which is the hallmark of transformative use.”130 Sag’s empirical 
analysis reveals a strong correlation between creativity shift and a finding 
of fairness.131  
Sag’s second contribution is the category of “non-expressive uses,” 
which he says are characteristic of “copy-reliant technologies,” such as 
search engines, electronic archives, and plagiarism detection software.132 
Sag acknowledges that the concept of non-expressive use is itself 
ambiguous.133 Early in the article, he argues that “acts of copying, which 
by their very nature cannot communicate the author’s original expression 
to the public should not . . . constitute . . . infringement.”134 Elsewhere in 
the article, however, Sag characterizes Field v. Google Inc.,135 which 
involved Google’s full display of cached copies of websites (which 
constitutes communication of expressive content to the public), as a case of 
non-expressive use.136 There he emphasizes the non-expressive purposes of 
Google’s displays—to monitor changes to websites over time, and to 
assess a search result’s relevance to the user’s query—and how different 
these purposes are from the purposes served by the original web pages in 
                                                                                                                          
without plaintiff’s permission, highlighting anti-Muslim remarks by the plaintiff radio host, was a fair 
use despite using an exact audio clip). 
125 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding as fair use distribution of an entire magazine parody to over 750,000 individuals). 
126 See Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2592.  
127 See id. at 2610. 
128 Sag, supra note 103, at 58.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. at 76 (finding that cases involving a creativity shift have a sixty-two percent chance of 
being found fair, regardless of other facts). 
132 Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1607–08 
(2009). 
133 Id. at 1640. 
134 Id. at 1626. 
135 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).  
136 Sag, supra note 132, at 1618. 
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isolation.137 The second, purpose-focused characterization is more 
consistent with Reese and Netanel’s findings about the centrality of 
purpose in determinations of transformativeness. In any event, cases 
involving these technologies have indeed resulted consistently in findings 
of fair use.138 Sag describes several such cases that predate his article, and 
subsequent cases consistent with this principle are described below. Like 
creativity shift, non-expressive use of the kind Sag describes has become a 
powerful predictor that a use will be found transformative and, therefore, 
fair.139 
Madison identifies a series of social and professional groups whose 
patterns of practice have been recognized by courts as deserving fair use 
recognition.140 Such examples include journalism, parody and satire, 
education and research, and comparative advertising. Where courts find 
that a defendant’s claim to be engaged in one of these patterns is credible, 
they have typically found the uses to be fair; where the claim is found 
wanting, fair use is withheld.141 Peter Jaszi and Patricia Aufderheide have 
operationalized this insight, working with a series of communities of 
practice to sharpen and define mission-based norms that describe when 
uncompensated use of copyrighted works is legitimate.142 These documents 
define favored uses in terms of legitimate mission-centered purposes, 
which are often further justified with reference to their transformative 
nature.143 
                                                                                                                          
137 Id. 
138 Professor Sag has participated in some of these cases as counsel for amici curiae. See, e.g., 
Brief of Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees and 
Affirmance, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 12-4547-cv), 2013 WL 
2702559. 
139 It is worth pointing out an irony here. Some commentators have insisted for years that fair use 
should only protect authors who must use existing works in the creation of their own expressive works, 
and they have decried the decisions vindicating search engines and other technological uses that do not 
result in a new work of authorship. See, e.g., Sanford G. Thatcher, From the University Presses—What 
Is Educational Fair Use?, 20 AGAINST THE GRAIN 62, 63 (2008) (arguing that fair use “traditionally” 
has functioned to protect “the creativity of others who wish to build on past work, adding value to it by 
embedding it in new work in the context of comment and criticism”). The irony is that, in fact, search 
engines have become perhaps the most solidly favored fair uses of all, precisely because their purpose 
is radically non-expressive. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(arguing that creation of a search index and display of text snippets is transformative because “the 
purpose of Google’s copying of the original copyrighted books is to make available significant 
information about those books” (emphasis in original)). 
140 See Madison, supra note 50, at 1646–47. 
141 See id. at 1645–46.  
142 See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE 127 (2010). 
143 See, e.g., ASS’N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR 
ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES 13 (2012), http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/publications/ 
code-of-best-practices-fair-use.pdf [http://perma.cc/3V7M-PP8U] (“[W]orks intended for consumption 
as popular entertainment present a case for transformative repurposing when an instructor uses them (or 
excerpts from them) as the objects of commentary and criticism, or for purposes of illustration.”). 
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In sum, scholarly examination of the fair use case law has revealed the 
following broad features of the doctrine as it has developed since 1978: 
 
1. The courts have shifted their focus from the fourth factor to 
the first factor as the key to the fair use inquiry. After a series of 
doctrinal false starts, including a presumption of unfairness for 
commercial uses and a circular concern with lost licensing revenue, 
the doctrine has settled on an approach that is grounded primarily in 
the justificatory power of the user’s purpose, rather than the alleged 
market harm to the copyright holder. 
2. The crucial first factor inquiry is heavily influenced by Judge 
Leval’s concept of “transformative use,” which he describes as use 
that advances copyright’s Constitutional objective of promoting 
progress by using existing works “in a different manner or for a 
different purpose,” “as raw material, transformed in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”144 
3. Although the “transformative use” concept was applied 
unevenly in some early cases, courts have since settled decisively on 
an approach that inquires into whether the purpose of the new use is 
distinct from the purpose of the original author. 
The class of transformative uses is diverse, but some useful subclasses 
have been identified. They include: Samuelson’s literally transformative, 
productive, and orthogonal uses; Sag’s “creativity shift” and non-
expressive uses; and Madison’s social patterns. Madison’s social patterns 
idea has, in turn, led to the development of even more fine-grained best 
practices statements delineating uncompensated uses that practice 
communities have identified as fair. 
C. Recent Decisions Show Transformative Use’s Potential Power and 
Scope for Educators 
Courts have not been idle in the years since Netanel’s survey of case 
law, and their work reinforces, and even strengthens, the conclusion that 
transformative use is the dominant paradigm. Below are some of the 
consequences of courts’ embrace of transformative use, with examples 
from recent decisions. 
1. A new use need not criticize or comment on an existing work 
in order to be fair, if its purpose and audience are sufficiently novel. 
                                                                                                                          
144 Leval, supra note 24, at 1111. 
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Because the Supreme Court’s most recent fair use decision involved a 
parody (and discussed at some length the difference between parody, 
which targets the work from which it borrows, and satire, which 
targets social phenomena distinct from its source material145), some 
courts have mistakenly suggested that all transformative uses must be 
critical of the works they reuse. However, the Second Circuit rejected 
the requirement of criticism or commentary outright in Cariou v. 
Prince,146 ruling that the district court had erred in requiring the 
defendant to have an intent to criticize or comment upon the works he 
used.147 Appropriation artist Richard Prince had expressly denied any 
intent to comment upon or criticize photographer Patrick Cariou or his 
work,148 but did express an intent to transform the photographs into 
completely different kinds of expression.149 The novel aesthetic 
experience created by Prince’s works, together with the difference 
between audiences interested in Prince’s works and those interested in 
Cariou’s, were sufficient to render Prince’s use transformative.150 The 
legal database and patent prosecution cases described below also 
involved uses without criticism or commentary. The courts’ embrace 
of fair use in these contexts should be helpful in defending educational 
uses of primary materials where the purpose is not necessarily to 
criticize or comment on the materials themselves, but rather to use 
them for an orthogonal purpose, or as evidence of a historical or 
cultural phenomenon.151 
2. Activities that do not involve literal alteration of the work or 
addition of new substantive material within the four corners of the 
copy can be “added value” for purposes of transformative analysis. In 
White v. West Publishing Corporation,152 Judge Rakoff, of the 
Southern District of New York, took into account a variety of 
                                                                                                                          
145 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (“Parody needs to mimic 
an original to make its point, and so [must] ha[ve] some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or 
collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires 
justification for the very act of borrowing.”). 
146 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).  
147 See id. at 706–07 (“The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its 
author in order to be considered transformative. . . . [Defendant’s] work could be transformative even 
without commenting on [Plaintiff’s] work or culture, and even without [Defendant’s] stated intention to 
do so.”). 
148 Id. at 707. 
149 See id. (“[W]hat I do is I completely try to change it into something that’s completely 
different. . . . I’m trying to make a kind of fantastic, absolutely hip, up to date, contemporary take on 
the music scene.”). 
150 See id. at 706, 709 (stating that the “entirely different aesthetics” and the “sort of collector” to 
which the defendant’s work appealed were fair use factors weighing in Prince’s favor). 
151 See infra Part IV.A. 
152 29 F. Supp. 3d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
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activities that involved neither literal alteration nor literal addition of 
new content within the four corners of the works, in finding that legal 
publishers West and Lexis—defendants in the infringement suit—had 
“added value” to the legal briefs they ingested into their databases.153 
Specifically, their work involved in “reviewing, selecting, converting, 
coding, linking, and identifying . . . documents” sufficed as evidence 
of “added value.”154 This added value, together with West’s novel 
purpose (supporting legal research), led the court to conclude West’s 
use was transformative. Educators who add value by placing 
copyrighted materials into context in their lectures or other educational 
exercises are arguably engaged in a similar transformative activity, 
provided that their purposes are also appropriately novel relative to the 
original purpose of the work.  
3. Copying and distribution that is conducted systematically and at a 
large scale can be found fair where the use is for a new purpose. In 
White, the legal database case described above, the database publishers 
ingested thousands of legal briefs filed in federal cases in order to 
make them available to hundreds of thousands of paying 
subscribers.155 Systematic and large-scale fair use was also involved in 
a pair of cases about copying and distribution of scientific journal 
articles in drafting and prosecuting patent applications.156 Similarly, in 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, the Second Circuit found the 
digitization, indexing, and even making available (for print-disabled 
patrons) of millions of in-copyright books held in university libraries, 
to be fair.157 The court reached the same conclusion in the companion 
case Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.158 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. at 399.  
154 Id.  
155 See id. at 398. Following Campbell, the court recognized that it was not fatal to the fair use 
claim that the “transformation was done for a commercial purpose.” Id. at 399.  
156 Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (finding fair use when “[d]efendants’ copying of [scientific journal articles] . . . 
d[id] not ‘supersede’ the use of Plaintiffs’ original works, but ha[d] the different purpose of providing a 
background context for patent examiners in their analysis of patent applications” (citing Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994))); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg, & 
Woessner, P.A., No. 12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013) (finding 
fair use largely because “there [wa]s no reasonable dispute that [Defendant] did not use the Articles 
‘for the same intrinsic purpose as [the Publishers]’” (emphasis added) (quoting Antioch Co. v. 
Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (D. Minn. 2003))). 
157 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2014). 
158 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing how the Google 
Books project resulted in the digital copying of “tens of millions” of in-copyright books). 
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4. Making entire, unaltered works available for reading or 
viewing may be found fair where the users’ (and the readers’) purpose 
differs sufficiently from the original purpose of the work, and the 
amount taken is justified by that novel purpose. In Swatch Group 
Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg LP,159 for example, the 
Second Circuit held that it was fair use for the news organization 
Bloomberg to post the entirety of a recorded Swatch earnings call 
online as part of Bloomberg’s financial reporting on the company.160 
Remarkably, the court’s initial opinion found that the use was fair 
despite its “commercial, nontransformative nature.”161 The court 
issued an amended opinion months later, removing that description, 
and adding a new section explaining the differences between the 
purpose of Swatch’s original call and the purpose of Bloomberg’s 
subsequent publication, and arguing that Bloomberg’s use was “at 
least . . . arguably transformative” because of its novel purposes.162 
Similarly, novel purposes also led to findings of fair use in American 
Instistute of Physics v. Winstead, P.C. and American Institute of 
Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg, and Woessner, P.A.163 In each of 
these cases, the original work was published to a defined audience to 
serve a defined purpose, and fair use permitted subsequent copying 
and distribution of the entire work where both purpose and audience 
were different. 
5. Even where the purpose is transformative and the amount used 
is justified in light of that purpose, fair use may take into account the 
potential for unintended “market substitution.” In his opinion in 
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., Judge Leval considers not only whether 
Google’s purpose in using the traditional scans was merely 
substitutional (and therefore non-transformative), but also whether 
Google’s use might provide enough of the copyrighted works to the 
public inadvertently to “serve as an effectively competing substitute 
for the original,”164 which “might therefore diminish the original rights 
holder’s sales and profits.”165 While many courts have observed that a 
copyright holder cannot preempt transformative uses by establishing a 
                                                                                                                          
159 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.), amended and superseded by Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. 
Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014).  
160 Id. at 27.  
161 Id.  
162 Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., 756 F.3d at 85. 
163 See cases cited supra note 156. 
164 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015). 
165 Id. 
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licensing market for those uses,166 Judge Leval is concerned here about 
unintended harm to the non-transformative market as a result of 
transformative uses that provide wide access to large (or important) 
portions of the text. Despite the transformative intentions of the user, 
the public could, in such cases, use the supplied portions as an 
alternative to purchasing the original for ordinary consumption. To 
avoid running afoul of this aspect of the market harm inquiry, 
educational users will need to ensure that access to materials used 
transformatively for education is limited to audiences engaged in the 
transformative activity, and that those audiences are discouraged from 
repurposing the materials as market substitutions.167 
III.  EDUCATION LEFT BEHIND? 
The effects of these developments in the fair use case law have been 
felt by Internet companies, publishers, artists, and even research libraries, 
but teachers have, so far, been left behind. Three historical factors explain 
this: (1) the existence of pseudo-authoritative guidelines for education 
grounded in the market-centered paradigm; (2) a misreading of dicta in 
Campbell; and (3) the publishers’ litigation strategy of initially suing copy-
shops rather than universities. In addition to these historical factors, two 
mistaken assumptions have distorted the law in this area: the assumption 
that transformative use requires literal alteration of the work used, and the 
assumption that educational uses always involve works made for 
educational purposes. This Part first explores each of these contributing 
causes, and then shows how Cambridge II simultaneously marks the end of 
the Guidelines-coursepack era and exemplifies the continuing influence of 
the market-centered approach for non-transformative teaching uses. 
A.   Educational Guidelines Grounded in the Market-Centered Paradigm  
Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, a series of negotiated 
guidelines have purported to describe reasonable limits for educational fair 
use.168 The two such documents that have had the widest impact are the 
                                                                                                                          
166 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd, 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 
2006) (citing cases distinguishing between traditional markets and “transformative markets,” and 
explaining that the fourth factor only recognizes harm to the former). 
167 In evaluating Google’s provision of “snippets” from books as search results, Judge Leval 
writes that the third factor is concerned primarily with “the amount and substantiality of what is thereby 
made accessible to a public for which it may serve as a competing substitute.” Authors Guild, 2015 WL 
6079426, at *30. Students are not “a public” in this regard insofar as they use the materials for 
transformative purposes, but if they reuse excerpts for non-transformative purposes, their uses may 
weigh against fair use according to Judge Leval’s rationale.  
168 For a survey of the various guidelines, see Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair-Use and the 
Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 603 n.4 (2001). 
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Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit 
Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals 
(“Classroom Guidelines”)169 and the Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for 
Educational Multimedia (“Multimedia Guidelines”).170 They aim to 
provide educators with certainty by replacing the broad and flexible 
doctrine of fair use with a series of concrete rules dictating exactly how 
much material may be safely copied from various kinds of original works, 
whether copying may be repeated from semester to semester, and so on.  
The Classroom Guidelines use the concepts of “brevity,” 
“spontaneity,” and “cumulative effect” as the criteria for fairness. Each of 
these terms is further defined to create a clear, quantitative, and decidedly 
conservative vision. For example, “brevity” in the context of prose works 
means “[e]ither a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 words, 
or . . . an excerpt from any prose work of not more than 1,000 words or 
10% of the work, whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 
words.”171 “Spontaneity” requires, among other things, that “[t]he 
inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for 
maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission.”172 The 
“cumulative effect” prong bars the use of multiple excerpts from the same 
author, as well as use of the same excerpts in more than one course in the 
school.173 Additional limitations bar any use “to create or to replace or 
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works,”174 as well as 
any use of the same excerpted material for more than one term.175 Even 
taken as a minimum safe harbor, which is what they purport to be,176 the 
Classroom Guidelines are quite limiting. On the other hand, taking them as 
the outer limit on fair use, as the publishers subsequently urged educators 
to do, the Guidelines suggest an intent with regard to fair use that 
resembles conservative activist Grover Norquist’s aspirations for 
government: “to reduce it to the size where I can drag it into the bathroom 
and drown it in the bathtub.”177 The Guidelines have been roundly 
                                                                                                                          
169 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976). 
170 STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON COURTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR EDUC. MULTIMEDIA (Comm. Print 1996).  
171 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68. 
172 Id. at 69. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 See id. at 68 (“The purpose of the following guidelines is to state the minimum standards of 
educational fair use under [§] 107 . . . .”). 
177 John P. Avlon, Republicans Wisely Break with Grover Norquist, CNN (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/26/opinion/avlon-grover-norquist/ [http://perma.cc/D35V-WUS2]. 
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criticized for their misleading air of legal authority,178 and for their limited 
utility as legislative history.179 
Nevertheless, courts confronted with cases about educational use have 
turned to the Classroom Guidelines as a source of information and even 
quasi-authority.180 Courts have looked to the Guidelines as a kind of 
legislative history, and have even used them as a model for injunctive 
relief. Judicial interest in the Guidelines has waned dramatically in recent 
years, however. Most recently, both the district and appellate courts in 
Cambridge I and Cambridge II refused to consider the Classroom 
Guidelines as a limitation on educational copying.181 Judge Evans, of the 
district court, characterized their restrictive limits as “undermin[ing] the 
teaching objective favored by § 107,”182 while Judge Tjoflat, of the 
appellate court, warned that “to treat the Classroom Guidelines as 
indicative of what is allowable would be to create the type of ‘hard 
evidentiary presumption’ that the Supreme Court has cautioned against.”183 
There is an additional reason to treat the various negotiated guidelines 
with suspicion: they reflect the now-disfavored, market-centered approach 
to fair use. Several aspects of the Classroom Guidelines reveal their 
market-centered approach. For example, as Wendy Gordon observed, “the 
Guidelines for Educational Fair Use in the House Report single out for fair 
use treatment instances of classroom photocopying in which bargains are 
particularly unlikely to occur because the teacher’s use is spontaneous, 
                                                                                                                          
178 See, e.g., Crews, supra note 168, at 649 (recognizing view among courts that the “Classroom 
Guidelines . . . are not law,” but rather “a compelling source of congressional insight on fair use”); 
Kasunic, supra note 41, at 281 (arguing that use of the Classroom Guidelines as limits on copyright fair 
use is inconsistent with legislative intent).  
179 See Gilbert Busby, Note, Fair Use and Educational Copying: A Reexamination of Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 86 KY. L.J. 675, 706–07 (1997) (arguing that 
reliance on Classroom Guidelines is inappropriate because 17 U.S.C. § 107 is facially unambiguous); 
see also, e.g., Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (recognizing that § 107 
intentionally sets “very general standards for determining fair use” which are to be “flexibly applied,” 
rather than reduced to strict quantitative limits), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).       
180 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphic Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). Judge Motley’s use of the Classroom Guidelines is quite complex, and perhaps confusing. At 
first, she seems to treat them as a separate source of law, which the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke, id., 
but later, she says Kinko’s is not subject to the Guidelines because of its for-profit status, id. at 1535–
36. She goes on to evaluate Kinko’s conduct according to the Guidelines, anyway, as a kind of 
hypothetical exercise, but stops short of finding that “violating the Guidelines” per se disqualifies 
Kinko’s conduct from fair use consideration. Id. at 1543.  
181 See Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1273 (“[T]he Classroom Guidelines, although part of the 
legislative history of the Copyright Act, do not carry the force of law.”); Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1228–29 (declining to apply the fair use standards as set out in the Classroom Guidelines over the 
statutory standards as outlined in 17 U.S.C. § 107).   
182 Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. 
183 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
584 (1994)). 
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individual and unsystematic.”184 The Classroom Guidelines suggest, in 
other words, that if a use is such that a license probably could be sought 
(because the use is planned, rather than “spontaneous”), is at a scale 
sufficient to demonstrate market demand (because the same excerpt is used 
in multiple courses, is repeated from term to term, or is “directed by higher 
authority”), or if excerpts are of a portion large enough that students could 
potentially be required to purchase an entire work, then a license must be 
sought.185 Another indication of both guidelines’ market-centered approach 
is their use of hard quantitative limits on amounts copied, which is 
inconsistent with the flexible standard of transformative use. For example, 
in applying the transformative use paradigm, judges generally ask whether 
the amount taken is appropriate to the purpose of the use, and have 
repeatedly blessed use of entire works under this standard.186 In contrast, 
the market-centered paradigm disfavors a use in proportion to the amount 
taken, regardless of purpose. 
In recent years, pushback against the Classroom Guidelines’ market-
oriented approach has begun to move beyond the academic literature and 
into the frontlines of educational practice. Perhaps most tellingly, the 
Consortium of College and University Media Centers (CCUMC), a key 
endorser and promoter of the Multimedia Guidelines, has withdrawn its 
endorsement, citing evolving fair use doctrine as its justification.187 
CCUMC is the latest of many associations of educators and related groups 
to develop or endorse fair use best-practices statements grounded in the 
transformative use paradigm as a replacement for the market-centered 
guidelines.188 Nevertheless, other institutions trusted by some educators 
continue to promote the Classroom Guidelines approach.189 
                                                                                                                          
184 Gordon, supra note 50, at 1628. 
185 If you take the guidelines at their word when they purport to be minimum safe harbors rather 
than maximum limits, then perhaps the takeaway is, at a minimum, that when a license cannot be paid, 
then a license need not be paid. 
186 This is not to say that transformative use consistently favors generous reuse; indeed, where a 
user takes more than is appropriate for her purpose, courts have found that the third factor does not 
favor fair use, even in transformative use cases. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 
575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (reasoning that the third factor weighed against fair use 
where defendant-author of reference book “t[ook] more than [wa]s reasonably necessary to create a 
reference guide”). 
187 CCUMC Adopts Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries, 
CCUMC (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.ccumc.org/blogpost/1054055/174940/CCUMC-Adopts-Code-of-
Best-Practices-in-Fair-Use-for-Academic-and-Research-Libraries [http://perma.cc/UQP7-4EAS].   
188 See AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 142, at 119–25 (recognizing the adoption of such codes 
by companies and organizations in several prominent industries, including online media, live 
performance, teaching and education, and software development); Best Practices: Fair Use for the 
Visual Arts, CTR. FOR MEDIA & SOC. IMPACT, http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair-use/best-practices 
[http://perma.cc/5FHK-PXZP] (last visited Aug. 8, 2014) (listing various codes of best practices). 
189 See, e.g., Using Content: Photocopies, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., http://www.copy 
right.com/Services/copyrightoncampus/content/index.html [http://perma.cc/EH2Z-9XJJ] (last visited 
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B.  “Straight Reproduction” in Campbell Footnote Eleven 
In Footnote Eleven of Campbell, Justice Souter, in the midst of his 
embrace of the transformative use concept, explained in dicta that not all 
fair uses must be transformative.190 He paraphrased the preamble of § 107, 
writing that “[t]he obvious statutory exception to this focus on 
transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for 
classroom distribution.”191 As Peter Jaszi has observed, Justice Souter’s 
formulation in Footnote Eleven—“straight reproduction”—seems to 
suggest that the uses at issue are ones where the teacher does not add 
value; the formulation may also assume that the teacher’s use is not for a 
new purpose.192 It is also possible that Justice Souter assumed the materials 
being copied in “straight reproduction[s] . . . for classroom distribution”193 
were created and marketed primarily for classroom use, such as textbook 
or workbook illustrations and exercise pages. Unfortunately, neither the 
footnote nor the relevant legislative history is sufficiently rich to confirm 
or falsify these possibilities.  
What is clear, however, is that Justice Souter’s dictum laid the 
foundation for a false dichotomy between transformative uses on one hand 
and educational copying on the other in subsequent cases. In Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services (MDS),194 decided just 
two years after Campbell, the Sixth Circuit panel divided itself into two 
camps: the majority, which argued that making and selling coursepacks 
was both commercial and non-transformative and therefore was not fair 
use, and the dissents, who argued these uses were specially favored 
because they were educational. Two of the three dissents cited the statutory 
language cited in Footnote Eleven. Dissents by Chief Judge Boyce and 
Judge Merritt ignored transformative use completely, despite its centrality 
in Campbell, and argued instead that the “multiple copies for classroom 
use” language was a categorical blessing for all such uses.195 Judge Ryan’s 
dissent conceded that the “transformative value of the coursepacks is 
                                                                                                                          
Sept. 21, 2015) (linking prominently to the Classroom Guidelines); Reproduction of Copyrighted 
Works by Educators and Librarians, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Aug. 2014), http://copyright.gov/ 
circs/circ21.pdf [http://perma.cc/2GGH-77M3] (reprinting, for informational purposes, the full text of 
the Classroom Guidelines for use by educators and librarians).     
190 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.11 (1994). 
191 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (stating that “reproduction in copies . . . for purposes such 
as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use) . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).   
192 See Jaszi, supra note 36, at 46 n.15. 
193 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.11.  
194 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
195 See id. at 1393 (Boyce, J., dissenting) (arguing that fair use “requires unlimited public access 
to published works in educational settings”); id. at 1394 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
coursepack copying is “permissible under the plain language of the copyright statute that allows 
‘multiple copies for classroom use’”). 
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slight,” but invoked the statutory text and the Campbell footnote as a kind 
of savings clause.196 Unfortunately, none of the dissents had a satisfactory 
answer to the majority’s argument that uses for the preambular purposes, 
including “teaching,” were not categorically fair, but rather had to be 
further evaluated according to the four statutory factors.197 Judge Ryan’s 
four factor analysis was much more robust than the other dissents, but it 
was still ultimately grounded in the notion that educational uses are 
special, regardless of transformativeness.198 The dissents’ arguments from 
educational exceptionalism were unpersuasive, and all of MDS’s uses were 
found to be infringing.199 
The GSU courts were somewhat more liberal in practice, but not in 
principle. Judge Orinda Evans cited Footnote Eleven in her opinion, 
accepting without question the publisher plaintiffs’ argument that posting 
assigned readings (“mirror images of parts of the books”) to a course 
website is non-transformative per se.200 Like Judge Ryan in MDS, the court 
claimed that Footnote Eleven conferred a privileged status on educational 
photocopying, saving it from an unfavorable finding under the first factor, 
but the court’s finding that the uses were non-transformative had 
substantial negative consequences, reducing the amount of the underlying 
work that could be used fairly.201 The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is similar, 
citing Footnote Eleven for the proposition that the first factor can favor 
non-transformative educational uses, then adding weight to the other side 
of the balance under factor four due to lack of transformative use.202 
Footnote Eleven seems to “save” educational uses from the transformative 
use test only to deliver them into a balancing test that can often disfavor 
them. 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 1400 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. at 1385 n.1 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.9 and S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975)). 
198 See id. at 1404 (“The coursepacks fit within the exception to the ‘transformative’ quality 
requirement, and the predominant character of the use of excerpts in coursepacks is not commercial but 
‘nonprofit educational.’”). 
199 Id. at 1397. The majority’s version of transformative use is relatively narrow compared to the 
doctrine as it is now applied: it compares the “mechanical” transformation involved in coursepacks 
unfavorably to the “creative metamorphosis accomplished by the parodists in the Campbell case.” Id. at 
1389. Of course, neither literal alteration nor the production of a new creative work is required for 
transformative use. See supra Part II. The dissents might have raised this objection, but instead chose to 
abandon the transformative use paradigm altogether, tempted away by the false promise of Footnote 
Eleven.  
200 Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (holding that the district court erred 
in giving the first fair use factor equal weight), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).  
201 See id. at 1224–25. 
202 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1263. 
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C.  The Coursepack Cases and the Publishers’ Efforts to Enforce the 
Guidelines 
As a result of the state of the law pre-Campbell, with fair use 
seemingly contingent on claims of lost licensing revenue, the publishers 
won a series of early litigation victories that effectively chilled educational 
fair use practice in the analog realm. In a thirty-year litigation campaign, 
publishers have enforced the Classroom Guidelines as maximum limits on 
all educational copying. That effort may have met its end in the GSU case, 
but its effects will be difficult to erase. 
The first wave of lawsuits came shortly after the passage of the 1976 
Copyright Act and yielded across-the-board wins for the publishers: all 
defendants agreed to settlements enshrining the Guidelines as the limit of 
fair use.203 In these cases, the publishers initially targeted commercial copy 
shops,204 then sued New York University (NYU) and several NYU 
professors shortly after the shops settled.205 NYU and its faculty members 
also settled, acceding to an agreement that required them to abide by the 
Classroom Guidelines, but with a proviso allowing NYU’s general counsel 
to permit uses that exceed the Guidelines if subsequent case law permits.206 
The AAP publicized news of the settlement to other universities, who 
largely adopted the Guidelines as fair use maximums.207 
Nearly a decade later the publishers once again made the rounds to 
enforce the Classroom Guidelines, and again they pursued commercial 
copy shops as initial defendants.208 This time two shops refused to settle, 
giving courts their first opportunity to consider educational fair use and the 
import of the guidelines. The copy shops lost big. 
The publishers’ strategy of initially pursuing commercial copy shops 
succeeded wildly, as the courts focused on the shops’ commercial nature 
and their purely duplicative purpose, ignoring both professors and students, 
whose purposes were more complex and whose status was “non-profit, 
educational” under the first fair use factor.209 So, in Basic Books, Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                          
203 See, e.g., Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Photocopying Copyrighted Course Materials: Doesn’t 
Anyone Remember the NYU Case?, 50 EDUC. L. REP. 317, 322–25 (1989) (reprinting the NYU 
settlement agreement). 
204 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Tyco Copy Servs., Inc., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 
¶ 25,230 (D. Conn. 1981); Basic Books, Inc. v. Gnomon Corp., Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 25,145 (D. 
Conn. 1980).  
205 Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 
60 U. PITT. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1998).  
206 See Steinbach, supra note 203, at 322–27. Steinbach was counsel to the ad hoc committee of 
educational groups that negotiated the Classroom Guidelines.  
207 See Bartow, supra note 205, at 170. 
208 E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).     
209 The courts declined in both cases to allow the copy shops to stand in the shoes of their 
professor clients, whose purposes were non-profit, educational, and arguably transformative. As a 
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Kinko’s Graphics Corp., Judge Constance Baker Motley found that “the 
use in the hands of Kinko’s employees is commercial,” stating that Kinko’s 
effort to portray its use as educational “boggles the mind.”210 MDS was 
decided after Campbell had clearly done away with any “presumptive 
unfairness” associated with commercial use,211 yet the court in MDS still 
gave primacy to the market effect of the use, citing Harper & Row.212  
Neither of the copy shops were found to be engaged in transformative 
use. Judge Motley found Kinko’s use was non-transformative because its 
coursepacks were “mere repackaging” of copyrighted works with “no 
literary effort made by Kinko’s.”213 Judge Motley’s opinion was a tentative 
first draft of the transformative use doctrine in the courts, coming less than 
a year after publication of Judge Leval’s article. The Sixth Circuit’s 
opinion in MDS, however, is harder to explain. Despite the benefit of years 
and several cases applying the concept, including Campbell, the MDS court 
similarly focused on the lack of literal alteration in the copies themselves 
                                                                                                                          
result, schools have asked, in other contexts, for express statutory permission to contract with outside 
vendors in the course of exercising their statutory rights. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE & LIBRARY OF 
CONG., THE SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT iv (2008), http://www.section108.gov/docs/ 
Sec108StudyGroupReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NHV-6UXG] (“[17 U.S.C. §] 108 should be amended 
to allow a library or archives to authorize outside contractors to perform at least some activities 
permitted under [§] 108 on its behalf . . . .”). Strikingly, publishers themselves have won many 
significant fair use victories by standing in the shoes of the authors whose works they reproduce and 
distribute for profit. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006) (attributing to publisher Dorling Kindersley the fair use motives of its author(s)); New Era 
Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1990) (attributing biography author’s use 
of written excerpts to the publisher). More than a decade after MDS, Judge Chin (then of the Southern 
District of New York) allowed Google to invoke the fairness of the libraries’ purposes when 
universities partnered with Google to digitize millions of in-copyright books from university library 
collections. Citing a separate opinion vindicating the libraries’ uses of their digitized copies as fair use, 
Judge Chin held that Google’s digitization on the libraries’ behalf was therefore also fair use. Authors 
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Judge Leval reached the 
same conclusion on appeal. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015) (“If the 
library had created its own digital copy to enable its provision of fair use digital searches, the making of 
the digital copy would not have been infringement. Nor does it become an infringement because, 
instead of making its own digital copy, the library contracted with Google that Google would use its 
expertise and resources to make the digital conversion for the library’s benefit.”). It is far from clear, 
then, that the coursepack cases’ approach is the correct one. 
210 Kinko’s, 758 F. Supp. at 1531–32. Judge Motley also invoked the Sony dictum about a 
presumption against fair use for commercial uses. Id. at 1530. The Supreme Court would later disavow 
the presumption in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583–84 (1991).  
211 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (“In giving virtually dispositive weight to the commercial 
nature of the parody, the Court of Appeals erred. . . . If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive 
force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses 
listed in the preamble paragraph of 17 U.S.C. § 107 . . . since these activities are generally conducted 
for profit in this country.” (internal citations omitted)). 
212 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating 
that the fourth factor “is at least primus inter pares,” or first among equals, and discussing that factor, 
rather than purpose and character, first). 
213 Kinko’s, 758 F. Supp. at 1530 (citing Leval, supra note 24, at 1111). 
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in finding the use in MDS non-transformative,214 and compounded the error 
by finding that for such uses Campbell had left in place the presumption of 
unfairness in Sony.215 The Sixth Circuit panel also derived from Footnote 
Eleven of Campbell and the related statutory parenthetical, a per se rule 
that transformative use analysis is irrelevant to educational uses.216 In 
reality, the “slight transformative value” of the use led the court to leave in 
place the Sony presumption of unfairness and abetted the court’s overall 
focus on the alleged market effects of the use.217 Together, these aspects of 
the analysis were fatal to MDS. 
Although a different analysis might have applied if the copies were 
made by educational institutions themselves rather than for-profit copy 
shops,218 the impact of the decisions on all educational copying was swift 
and dramatic. Indeed, the impact of Kinko’s was evident when the Sixth 
Circuit decided MDS five years later, as the court noted the proprietor of 
MDS was an outlier in his belief that the case was wrongly decided, and 
repeatedly contrasted MDS’s practice with the majority of copy shops’ 
dutiful payment of royalties.219 In the wake of these cases, it became 
standard practice to seek and pay for permissions in connection with 
virtually all excerpts included in coursepacks, whether they were 
assembled by for-profit copy shops, on-campus copy centers, or even 
libraries.220 Publishers and their partner licensing bodies have promoted 
                                                                                                                          
214 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389. 
215 Id. at 1386. 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 194–200. 
217 Or, as Ann Bartow writes, “the court effectively merged the § 107 four-part fair use test into 
one two part question: Was the use commercial, and if so, did it divert revenues from the copyright 
owner?” Bartow, supra note 205, at 189. This is the mirror image of the two-part question that 
embodies the transformative use inquiry: is the use transformative, and if so, did the user take only as 
much as appropriate given her transformative purpose? 
218 The Sixth Circuit recognized the distinction in MDS, although it cast doubt on whether it might 
make a difference. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (“As to the proposition that it would be fair 
use for the students or professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt. 
We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that the copying complained of here was 
performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise.”). Judge Ryan, in one of three 
dissenting opinions, argued to the contrary that MDS had not “used” the copyrighted work at all for 
purposes of fair use and that the students’ use of the coursepacks was the appropriate subject of the fair 
use analysis. Id. at 1401 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Ultimately, both the district court and the appellate court 
in the GSU case held that the distinction between copy shops and educators was crucial with respect to 
the first fair use factor.  
219 Id. at 1384 (“After Kinko’s . . . many copyshops that had not previously requested permission 
from copyright holders began to obtain such permission.”). 
220 See David R. Hansen, A State Law Approach to Preserving Fair Use in Academic Libraries, 
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (2011) (“These ‘copyshop’ cases have uniformly 
failed to find fair use in the creation and sale of coursepacks, and have led libraries to adopt those 
rulings as fearsome precedent for their own practices.” (footnote omitted)).  
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this expansive application of the coursepack cases.221 Even some faculty 
members have internalized the maxim that all copy shop uses should be 
licensed—as well as any allegedly analogous use.222 
Copyright scholars have criticized the coursepack cases, but no one has 
suggested that the analysis of coursepacks and related uses might change 
appreciably if courts deployed transformative use as that concept is now 
understood. Instead, the few scholars who have written about these cases 
have (mis)applied transformative use in exactly the same way the courts 
had done, believing that it requires literal alteration of the materials used, 
or else assuming that works used for education are not sufficiently 
repurposed to count as transformative.  
For example, Ann Bartow takes Judge Motley to task for insisting on 
literal transformation when works are “most pedagogically useful when 
unadulterated.”223 Gilbert Busby argues that coursepacks are 
transformative because they are unique compilations that embody the 
professors’ creativity in selecting and arranging excerpts,224 confusing the 
transformation involved in fair use with that involved in creation of 
derivative works.225 More recently, David Simon follows a similar line but 
comes closer in observing that “transformativeness can exist when portions 
of several works are copied and juxtaposed—that is the whole basis for 
teaching; teachers often (and rightly) use sometimes unrelated materials in 
                                                                                                                          
221 See, e.g., Using Content: Photocopies, supra note 189 (“It is now well established that 
photocopying materials for academic coursepacks requires permission from the copyright holder or its 
agent.”). 
222 See, e.g., Stop Pirating Copyrighted Course Readings, JOHN P. MCCASKEY, 
http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/index.php/blog/75-piracy [http://perma.cc/AQB3-EV56] (“The 
test is simple: If the official coursepacks copy center that your bookstore uses would demand the 
purchase of reproduction rights, then any attempt to get around that—a local copy shop, emailing a 
PDF, handing out copies in class, uploading to a course web site, having the library upload to an online 
course reserves—is piracy.”). McCaskey’s blog post is strikingly similar to Judge Vinson’s 
concurrence in the GSU appellate decision, and to the publishers’ arguments regarding so-called 
“media neutrality.” Cambridge II, 767 F.3d 1232, 1287 (11th Cir. 2014) (Vinson, J., concurring). 
223 Bartow, supra note 205, at 178. At the same time Bartow suggests that “[p]rofessors compiling 
course packets inevitably make editorial, if not transformative, choices when they excerpt works.” Id. 
She does not pursue the argument any further, however. 
224 Busby, supra note 179, at 701 (“By extracting from various works, arranging them in a 
particular way, and adding his or her own commentary, a professor can produce a course pack that is a 
unique product with no adequate substitute.”). 
225 See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright transform an original work into a 
new mode of presentation, such works unlike works of fair use take expression for purposes that are not 
transformative.”); Reese, supra note 101, at 467 (“[A]ppellate courts do not view fair use 
transformativeness as connected with any transformation involved in preparing a derivative work, 
and . . . in evaluating transformativeness the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than 
on any alteration the defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work.”).  
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conjunction with one another for pedagogical purposes,”226 but he later 
concludes that transformativeness has “little relevance, in [its] traditional 
sense, in educational fair use.”227 Simon tries to soften the blow by 
suggesting that the statutory parenthetical about “multiple copies for 
classroom use” could be enough to cover the “many times” that 
educational uses will not be transformative, but MDS shows how courts 
can turn that supposed safe harbor into a cage.228 
New technology has created an opportunity for educators to take a less 
restrictive approach to use of copyrighted materials for teaching. Online 
course management systems and electronic reserves make it possible for 
professors and librarians to post materials directly to websites accessible 
only to students in a relevant class, without the costs or labor involved in 
creation and distribution of physical copies. With no literal paper 
“anthology,” no money changing hands (not even to cover labor or 
materials), no easy way for non-students to see how materials were being 
shared, and perhaps no obvious place to exercise centralized control or 
oversight of the activity, electronic distribution seemed to create a safe 
space for institutions to try new approaches to sharing material. Many 
colleges and universities took a more flexible approach, grounded in a fair 
use checklist developed by Kenneth W. Crews and Dwayne Buttler, which 
replaced strict quantitative limits with a less bounded instruction in which 
teachers walk through various factors on a checklist and “consider the 
relative persuasive strength of the circumstances.”229  
Not surprisingly, publishers soon began to approach universities with 
complaints about their practices with electronic course reserves, which 
publishers characterize as modern-day coursepacks. The Copyright 
Clearance Center has coined the term “e-coursepacks” to describe online 
                                                                                                                          
226 David A. Simon, Teaching Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 453, 501 n.261 (2009). 
227 Id. at 507. Simon argues that “numerous types of copying done by teachers” are non-
transformative in the same way as time-shifting in Sony and archiving in Texaco. Id. at 509. I do not 
disagree (see Part V, infra, regarding non-transformative teaching uses), but I am interested here in the 
many teaching uses that differ from Sony and Texaco in that they use existing materials for new 
purposes. Simon quotes Laura Heymann's suggestion that uses like in Sony and Texaco should not be 
subject to transformativeness analysis because they “displac[e] the copy in which the work is 
instantiated,” id., which is fair as far as it goes. Heymann argues that literal copying without alteration 
can still be transformative “[i]f distinct discursive communities can be identified surrounding each 
copy.” Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 445, 455 (2008). This is precisely what happens when teachers bring works into the 
classroom that were not intended to be the subject of classroom study, i.e., whose original discursive 
community is outside the educational realm. 
228 Simon, supra note 226, at 508 (“Many times educational uses will not be transformative, 
strictly speaking—that is what § 107 recognizes when it states that making ‘multiple copies for 
classroom use’ is fair use.”).  
229 Fair Use Checklist, COLUM. UNIV. LIBR., http://copyright.columbia.edu/basics/fair-use/fair-
use-checklist.html [https://perma.cc/S3AS-3HQM] (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).  
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“collection[s] of journal, magazine, or newspaper articles, book excerpts, 
and other materials selected by a course instructor for distribution to 
students as required or supplemental reading” and declares in its “Campus 
Guide to Copyright Compliance” that “[e]-coursepacks, like their paper-
based counterparts, require copyright permission from the copyright holder 
or its agent.”230 At first, negotiations took place outside of the courtroom, 
though the possibility of litigation loomed in the background.  
In 2006, Cornell University and the American Association of 
Publishers (AAP) announced an agreement that had averted legal action, 
which seems mostly to have consisted of Cornell’s announcing that the 
same rules apply to electronic reserves as had applied to paper coursepacks 
(leaving the import of that equivalence open to interpretation).231 Three 
more institutions eventually announced essentially identical “agreements” 
with the AAP (a policy statement that electronic materials should be 
treated like coursepacks), all under threat of litigation.232 The AAP 
understood this equivalence to mean use of electronic materials must be 
brought into line with the deformed, guidelines-based practices that had 
come about as a result of their litigation in the coursepack realm.233 In any 
case, other universities did not engage the AAP’s threats, and one 
university’s policies became the subject of the first test case for electronic 
sharing of materials in an educational setting. 
                                                                                                                          
230 Using Content: Photocopies, supra note 189.  
231 See Laura Rice, C.U. Changes E-Reserve Policy to Avoid Lawsuit, CORNELL DAILY SUN (Oct. 
3, 2006, 1:43 AM), http://cornellsun.com/blog/2006/10/03/cu-changes-ereserve-policy-to-avoid-law 
suit/. Cornell’s current overall copyright guidance appears to be fairly standard and revolves around the 
use of a checklist, with no mention of an agreement with publishers. CORNELL UNIV. OFFICE OF THE 
PROVOST, A FACULTY GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT (2009), https://web.archive.org/web/20110906103507/ 
http://cornellsun.com/node/18733 [https://perma.cc/A6UU-Q372]. However, a separate document 
dealing specifically with the use of electronic course content is consistent with the press accounts of the 
AAP-Cornell agreement in that it stipulates that electronic materials should follow the same norms as 
paper coursepacks. CORNELL UNIV., ELECTRONIC COURSE CONTENT COPYRIGHT GUIDELINES, 
http://copyright.cornell.edu/policies/docs/Copyright_Guidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CE8-ZW8D] 
(“Any use of copyrighted electronic course content that would require permission from the copyright 
owner if the materials were part of a printed coursepack likewise requires the copyright owner’s 
permission when made available in electronic format.”). 
232 Andrew Albanese, E-Reserve Reached Under Duress?, 133 LIBR. J. 20, 21 (2008) (describing 
agreements announced by Syracuse, Hofstra, and Marquette).  
233 University Presses Welcome New Cornell Guidelines on Use of Digital Course Content, 
AAUP (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.aaupnet.org/news-a-publications/323-cornell-guidelines [http://per 
ma.cc/CM4X-28EA] (“As for the guidelines themselves, they’re built on a brilliantly simple principle: 
if you would have had to clear permission to use copyrighted work in the world of printed coursepacks, 
you need to clear permission to use it in the new world of electronic reserves and course management 
systems.”).  
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D.  Georgia State and the End of the Guidelines/Coursepacks Era  
In December 2008 a group of academic publishers (with substantial 
help and financial backing from the Copyright Clearance Center and the 
AAP) brought a lawsuit against various administrators and the Board of 
Regents at GSU, alleging widespread copyright infringement on electronic 
course sites and the library electronic reserves platform that faculty use to 
share materials with their students. The effects of the Classroom 
Guidelines, Campbell Footnote Eleven, and the coursepack cases can all be 
felt in the GSU case. The lack of a strong transformative use analysis 
shaped the university’s policy and its litigation strategy, the publishers’ 
own litigation strategy, and the opinions of both the district and the 
appellate courts. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion highlights the value of a 
transformative vision of teaching. 
GSU’s official e-reserves policy, The Regent’s Guide to 
Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair Use, had been drafted with 
guidance from L. Ray Patterson, a respected copyright scholar, and it 
unequivocally rejected the Classroom Guidelines as a source of authority 
as to what constitutes fair use.234 The relatively broad and flexible vision of 
educational fair use in the Regent’s Guide may have been what attracted 
the AAP and CCC to GSU as a defendant.235 If so, they won a small 
victory almost immediately: shortly after the publishers sued, the 
University System of Georgia abandoned the Regent’s Guide and adopted 
a new approach that mirrored the policies at many other universities. This 
approach involved providing faculty with a fair use checklist and some 
general information about the fair use factors and how to weigh them, and 
instructing faculty to use the checklist to determine for themselves whether 
                                                                                                                          
234 L. Ray Patterson, Regents Guide to Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair Use, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 243, 245 (1997). Ironically, even though Professor Patterson’s views of fair use are 
almost prophetic in their emphasis on legitimate purpose and users’ rights, the Regent’s Guide still 
retains a bit of the market-centered approach to the doctrine, stating that “[t]he location of the line 
between fair use and infringing use is determined by the market factor, that is, the extent to which the 
copy becomes a substitute for the purchase of the work.” Id. at 258 n.17. This question of substitution 
can be turned in favor of the user, however, and has been most recently in the HathiTrust case. Indeed, 
the Second Circuit made “non-substitution” its touchstone for transformative use, and found 
resoundingly in favor of the universities. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 
2014). Judge Leval also discusses substitution throughout his opinion in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
804 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2015) (observing that transformative use favors a finding of fair use “unless 
the value of its transformative purpose is overcome by its providing text in a manner that offers a 
competing substitute for Plaintiffs’ books”). 
235 Another irritant that may have drawn the AAP and CCC to GSU is the Georgia Attorney 
General’s decision to issue an unofficial opinion repudiating the Kinko’s decision. Patterson, supra note 
234, at 281.  
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their uses were fair. A fair use training session was held, but was not 
widely attended.236 
The publishers pressed the same basic case they had been arguing 
since the NYU case in the 1980s: professors who distribute materials to 
their students without paying licensing fees are violating the Classroom 
Guidelines and causing cognizable market harm to the publishers.237 They 
cited the coursepack cases and argued that GSU’s e-reserves were really 
just e-coursepacks. In a nod to the now dominant paradigm, the publishers 
also argued that the uses were non-transformative, and therefore were not 
fair.238 They met intense skepticism in both the district and the appellate 
court. 
In a 350-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Orinda D. Evans developed 
a rubric for assessing fair use of scholarly monographs (the only type of 
publication at issue in the case) and applied it to an agreed-upon sample of 
faculty-posted excerpts governed by the new policy.239 The opinion was 
hailed as a victory by many in the education community (including me),240 
due in large part to Judge Evans’ refusal to follow the coursepack cases,241 
her conclusion that the first factor “strongly favors” fair use for non-profit, 
educational uses,242 her highly critical treatment of the Classroom 
Guidelines,243 and the overall favorable outcome for GSU. Of ninety-nine 
alleged infringements, Judge Evans found only five were infringing. Due 
in part to this lopsided finding, Judge Evans designated GSU as the 
                                                                                                                          
236 See Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1204 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“Over half of [the professors] 
testified that they had not attended the training sessions GSU had held for professors concerning 
implementation of the 2009 Copyright Policy.”), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).  
237 Id. at 1235–36. 
238 Id. at 1224. 
239 See id. at 1210–11.  
240 See, e.g., BRANDON BUTLER, ASS’N OF RESEARCH LIBR., GSU FAIR USE DECISION RECAP 
AND IMPLICATIONS 1 (2012), http://www.arl.org/storage/documents/publications/issue-brief-gsu-decis 
ion-15may12.pdf [http://perma.cc/VE7X-KHRX]; Jennifer Howard, Long-Awaited Ruling in Copyright 
Case Mostly Favors Georgia State U., CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 13, 2012), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Long-Awaited-Ruling-in/131859/ [http://perma.cc/3UHP-MD7N].  
241 Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (“Because [GSU] is a purely nonprofit, educational 
institution and the excerpts at issue were used for purely nonprofit, educational purposes, this case is 
distinguishable from Kinko’s, Michigan Document Services, and Texaco.”). 
242 Id. at 1225. 
243 See, e.g., id. at 1229 (“[T]he Guidelines’ absolute cap, which would preclude a use from 
falling within the safe harbor solely on the basis of the number of words copied, is not compatible with 
the language and intent of § 107.”); id. at 1234 (finding the Guidelines’ approach “so restrictive [that it] 
undermines the teaching objective favored by § 107.”); id. at 1234–35 (“[T]he Guidelines’[] idea that 
professors be prohibited from unlicensed use of the same chapter from one academic term to the next is 
an impractical, unnecessary limitation.”). 
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prevailing party and awarded the university substantial costs and attorney’s 
fees.244 
On reflection, however, Judge Evans’ opinion leaves much to be 
desired, despite the favorable outcome for GSU. Most importantly, her 
reasoning (and the appellate court’s reasoning, in turn) was dramatically 
skewed by her hasty conclusion that because the uses involved “mirror-
image” copying, none of GSU’s uses were transformative.245 Judge Evans 
also found, based on her own examination of the books, that students were 
among the “target market” for all of the works at issue in the litigation.246 
While the consequences may not have been as stark as in the coursepack 
cases, this finding led to Judge Evans’ requirement that the amounts used 
be “decidedly small” in order to be favored under the third statutory 
factor.247 Judge Evans also gave substantial weight to publishers’ 
allegations of lost revenue under the fourth factor, though she conducted a 
much more searching inquiry into the question of market harm than any of 
the coursepack cases had done.248 In the end, because GSU’s uses had been 
relatively modest and the publishers had not in fact developed robust 
                                                                                                                          
244 See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may 
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party . . . . Except as otherwise provided by this title, 
the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”). 
245 Judge Evans never actually grapples with the question of whether GSU’s uses are 
transformative, but simply asserts in two places that the uses are non-transformative. See Cambridge I, 
863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224, 1232. Judge Evans was never presented with arguments from GSU about the 
potential transformativeness of the contested uses, at least in part because the GSU defendants’ use of a 
fair use checklist had placed them in an awkward position. The checklist includes a checkbox for 
teachers to indicate whether they believed their uses are “transformative.” People familiar with the 
litigation have informed me that a clear majority (if not all) of the checklists completed for uses at issue 
in the case indicated that teachers did not believe their uses were transformative, which created a paper 
trail that the GSU defense team decided not to contradict. Footnote Eleven of Campbell and the 
statutory reference to “multiple copies for classroom use” also played a role in encouraging GSU to 
pursue a non-transformative defense. Id. at 1223. Given the limited training they received, it is possible 
that the teachers who filled out the checklist did not understand what “transformative” means in the 
copyright context; without further guidance (or with limited guidance), they may have assumed it 
meant literal alteration of the original. In any event, the defense team decided not to press the 
transformative use question. 
246 Id. at 1211. 
247 Id. at 1232 (“Taking into account the fact that this case involves only mirror-image, 
nontransformative uses, the amount used must be decidedly small to qualify as fair use.”). Judge Evans 
did not, in fact, require that every use be “decidedly small” in order to qualify as fair; rather, she 
weighed the third factor against GSU in cases where the amount exceeded her quantitative limits. Id. at 
1254–55. Several “excessive” uses were found to be fair use due to the countervailing weight of the 
other factors favoring the university. See, e.g., id. at 1263–64 (finding use of two chapters fair due to 
minimal harm to plaintiffs’ market). 
248 Id. at 1239 (holding that “factor four weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor when permissions for 
digital excerpts are readily available”). 
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licensing options for many of the works at issue, GSU prevailed.249 Not 
surprisingly, the publishers appealed. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the decision for 
other reasons,250 its opinion approved key aspects of Judge Evans’ fair use 
analysis. In particular, the majority agreed that neither the coursepack 
cases nor the Classroom Guidelines should be given much weight, if any, 
in deciding cases involving non-profit educational uses like GSU’s. The 
coursepack cases had been about for-profit copy shops, not non-profit 
educators, and the court found that fact to be decisive.251 Like Judge Evans, 
the Eleventh Circuit found that the first factor should favor fair use for all 
of GSU’s uses due to their non-profit, educational nature.252 As for the 
Classroom Guidelines, Judge Tjoflat found several reasons to limit their 
influence: “they (1) were drafted by partisan groups, (2) ‘state the 
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use under [§] 
107’, and (3) adopt the type of ‘hard evidentiary presumption[s]’ regarding 
which types of use may be fair that the Supreme Court has since repeatedly 
warned against.”253 The court also approved Judge Evans’ searching 
exploration of the fourth factor, including placing the initial burden of 
production on the publishers as to the likelihood of cognizable market 
harm.254  
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the least salutary aspect of Judge 
Evans’ opinion, finding that GSU’s uses were not transformative. The 
court declined to reverse Judge Evans’ holding that GSU’s use of the 
excerpts was for one of the original intended purposes of the underlying 
works, as “reading material for students in university courses.”255 Judge 
Tjoflat relied on this factual finding in holding that GSU’s uses were not 
transformative, and that therefore “the threat of market substitution is 
significant.”256 The appellate court also agreed with Judge Evans that the 
                                                                                                                          
249 Id. at 1363–64 (indicating that GSU prevailed on ninety-four of the ninety-nine infringement 
claims). 
250 The court strongly disagreed with the “mechanical” nature of Judge Evans’ approach to the 
four factors, including her use of a simple binary rule for the second factor (use of “non-fiction” works 
favors fair use), a quantitative threshold for the third factor (ten percent or one chapter, depending on 
the length of the book), and her seemingly “arithmetic” approach to weighing the factors together, 
which awarded victory to whichever side was favored by more factors. Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232, 
1260 (11th Cir. 2014). The court also held that Judge Evans should have given the fourth factor more 
weight in light of the non-transformative nature of GSU’s uses. Id. at 1281. 
251 See id. at 1264 (noting that the coursepack cases had been brought against for-profit copy 
shops, not educators themselves); id. at 1267 (“Defendants’ use is not fairly characterized as 
‘commercial exploitation.’”); id. at 1275 (holding that the district court “properly declined to tie its 
analysis under the third factor to the Classroom Guidelines or to the coursepack cases”). 
252 Id. at 1267. 
253 Id. at 1246 n.12.    
254 Id. at 1281. 
255 Id. at 1263. 
256 Id. at 1267. 
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lack of literal alteration should be held against GSU in the transformative 
use analysis,257 although the Eleventh Circuit acknowledges that such 
alteration is not required for a finding of transformativeness.258  
The future of non-transformative educational fair use after the GSU 
decision seems quite uncertain. The Eleventh Circuit’s vision of a fair use 
balancing test has a strikingly schizophrenic quality. While educators may 
take solace that the first factor will consistently favor non-profit, 
educational uses, things get considerably less predictable from there. The 
second factor, the nature of the work used, which the district court had held 
would consistently favor fair use of non-fiction works, should instead be 
neutral or even weigh against fair use for works that “contain[] evaluative, 
analytical, or subjectively descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts, 
or derive from the author’s own experiences or opinions.”259 The most 
alarming aspect of the analysis is that, where uses are non-transformative, 
the fourth factor “looms large” and should be “afford[ed] relatively great 
weight” in the overall analysis.260 On the other hand, the fourth factor 
should recede in cases where no licensing market yet exists,261 but could 
presumably surge forward again if such a market is developed.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the third statutory factor, “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used,”262 simply acts as an 
amplifier of either the first factor or the fourth factor, depending on the 
availability of a license. The court explains that a use will be favored under 
the third factor if “the amount taken is reasonable in light of the purpose of 
the use and the likelihood of market substitution.”263 For transformative 
uses, this inquiry will yield a single coherent result, as any use that is 
appropriate to a transformative purpose is by definition non-
substitutional.264 For non-transformative uses, however, there is room for 
conflict. For uses where a licensing market for educational use of excerpts 
is readily available, the use will clearly be substitutional, even if (or 
perhaps especially if) the use is appropriate to the educational purpose. It is 
                                                                                                                          
257 Id. at 1262. 
258 See id. (“Even verbatim copying ‘may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different 
function than the original work.’” (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1446, 1165 (9th 
Cir. 2007))).  
259 Id. at 1283. At the same time, like all courts, the Eleventh Circuit gives the second factor 
“comparatively little weight.” Id. 
260 Id. at 1275, 1276 n.31.  
261 See id. at 1279 (agreeing with the trial court’s position that the availability of licensing 
information should be taken into account when assigning weight to the fourth fair use factor).    
262 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).   
263 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added) (quoting Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World 
Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1314 n.30 (11th Cir. 2008)).  
264 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[U]nder Factor 
Four, any economic ‘harm’ caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses, by 
definition, do not serve as substitutes for the original work.”). 
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unclear what a court is to make of the third factor in such circumstances, 
which are likely to be increasingly common as licenses for electronic use 
become available. The ambiguity within each factor, the equipoise across 
factors, and the court’s insistence that the final weighing of the factors 
must be a “holistic” and “carefully balanced” analysis, as opposed to being 
treated “mechanistically,”265 combine to leave educators in a deeply 
uncertain position. The safe response may well be to forego fair use 
whenever there is a license available, and to tread very carefully indeed 
even when there is not. 
Several amici who filed on the transformative use issue266 prompted 
the Eleventh Circuit majority to expressly disclaim any intent to prejudge 
future transformative uses. In footnote twenty-one, Judge Tjoflat issues the 
following acknowledgment: “Amici point out that excerpts in an electronic 
reserve system—like the ones at GSU—could be used for a different 
function than the original. . . . We need not rule on whether such uses 
could ever be transformative, because the question is not before us.”267 
Footnote twenty-one leaves the door open for a kind of fair use argument 
that could afford educators far greater flexibility, predictability, and scope 
in exercising their fair use rights. 
                                                                                                                          
265 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1283.  
266 The issue was raised most clearly and forcefully in a brief prepared by David Hansen, Peter 
Jaszi, Pamela Samuelson, Jason Schultz, and Rebecca Tushnet, who argued that GSU’s uses were 
transformative because they present the materials for new purposes. Brief of Amicus Curiae Academic 
Authors and Legal Scholars in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 2–3, Cambridge II, 
769 F.3d 1232 (Nos. 12-14676-FF & 12-15147-FF), 2013 WL 1869775. The Library Copyright 
Alliance made a similar argument as part of its brief, which I helped to draft. Brief of Amici Curiae 
Am. Library Ass’n et al. in Support of Affirmance at 11–15, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (Nos. 12-
14676-FF & 12-15147-FF), 2013 WL 1869773. A brief prepared by Jack I. Lerner and students from 
the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Clinic at the University of Southern California made the 
related point that even if GSU’s uses are not transformative, other educational uses surely are, and the 
court should not prejudge those cases. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors et al. 
in Support of Appellees at 2, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (Nos. 12-14676-FF & 12-15147-FF), 2013 
WL 1869771 (opining that the district court’s analysis did not fully account for the myriad classroom 
uses traditional to higher education and indispensible in classroom teaching). The court’s holding 
seems to follow most clearly from this last brief, though it is not cited. 
267 Cambridge II, 769 F.3d at 1263 n.21. Notably, the court cites the amicus briefs of the Library 
Copyright Alliance and of the Association of Southeastern Research Libraries for examples of future 
uses that could turn out to qualify for transformative treatment. See id. The former brief cites the Code 
of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries, Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Library 
Ass’n et al., supra note 266, at 6, which includes a principle describing fair use in sharing resources 
online, grounded in part in a transformative use rationale, see ASS’N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, supra 
note 143, at 13 (“Most of the information objects made available to students, in whatever format, are 
not originally intended for educational use.”). Obviously, these sources assume a factual predicate that 
the trial court rejected in the GSU case: that teachers use works in ways they were not originally 
intended. 
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IV.  VARIETIES OF TRANSFORMATIVE TEACHING 
Use of copyrighted materials for teaching can be transformative in 
precisely the ways described by scholars and favored by courts. This Part 
describes several categories of teaching uses that courts should bless as 
transformative. The typology of teaching uses presented here is by no 
means exhaustive, nor will it always be perfectly clear which category best 
describes any particular use. Film and literature courses that explore 
thematic trends may also have a heavy theory component, for example, 
making the distinction between Part IV.A.3 and Part IV.B.2 less clear. The 
categories below are only meant to be illustrative, both of the number and 
variety of teaching uses that can be characterized as transformative and of 
the ways of supporting and defending that characterization. As in every 
area of law, the facts of any particular case will be vital and the case theory 
must follow where they lead. More examples of transformative teaching 
practices can be found in the best practices statements published by a 
variety of educator communities.268  
Two caveats apply to each of these categories of use. First, the amount 
of the work used should be appropriate to the transformative purpose. Both 
Samuelson and Netanel have posited that a valid transformative purpose 
                                                                                                                          
268 See, e.g., VISUAL RES. ASS’N, STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR TEACHING, 
RESEARCH, AND STUDY 7–12 (2013), http://www.membership.vraweb.org/organization/pdf/VRA_Fair 
Use_Statement_Pages_Links.pdf [http://perma.cc/85W3-6BFJ] (advising on the fair use of images 
through preservation, in teaching, on course websites, in adaptations for teaching and classroom work, 
when shared, and when reproduced in theses and dissertations); CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, CODE OF BEST 
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR POETRY 9–15 (2011), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/pages/fairusepoetrybooklet_singlepg_3.pdf [http://perma.cc/35VV-JP9K] (setting forth fair use 
principles for the use of poetry in parody and satire, new works, criticism, epigraphs, on the internet, 
and in literary performance); CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR 
OPENCOURSEWARE 10–13 (2009), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/10-305-OCW-Oct29 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/5Z3Z-PUQF] (recommending standards for the fair use of online lectures in 
incidental use, use in critique and analysis, use for illustration, and use for demonstration or 
explanation); CTR. FOR SOC. MED., SOC’Y FOR CINEMA AND MEDIA STUDIES’ STATEMENT OF FAIR 
USE BEST PRACTICES FOR MEDIA STUDIES PUBLISHING 3–5 (2009), https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/cm 
studies.site-ym.com/resource/resmgr/docs/scmsbestpractices4fairuseinp.pdf [http://perma.cc/7K3F-PZ 
D6] (discussing the fair use of copyrighted works within media studies publishing, in categories 
illustrating historical, theoretical, or aesthetic arguments, as used to stimulate discussion, in multimedia 
scholarship, and when bundled with scholarship and teaching materials); CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, CODE 
OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION 10–14 (2008) [hereinafter CTR. 
FOR SOC. MEDIA, MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION] http://www.mediaeducationlab.com/sites/mediaeduc 
ationlab.com/files/CodeofBestPracticesinFairUse_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/CRA9-93X4] (providing 
advice on educational use in media literacy lessons, preparing curriculum materials, sharing curriculum 
materials, by students, and in developing audiences for student work); The Society for Cinema and 
Media Studies’ Statement of Best Practices for Fair Use in Teaching for Film and Media Educators, 47 
CINEMA J. 155, 157–62 (2008) (setting forth principles to guide media uses in classroom screenings, 
broadcast recordings, derivative works, including creation of clip collections, online distance education, 
and in the public domain).      
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can be undermined by use of an excessive amount of the original work.269 
“Appropriate amount” is an imprecise standard, but it indicates a flexible 
space where courts are likely to defer to a fair user with a compelling 
transformative purpose. The amount can be more than is strictly 
necessary,270 but at a certain point the purpose no longer justifies the 
taking. Indeed, as Judge Leval argues, courts may look to the amount taken 
as an additional indicator of whether the use truly is transformative; taking 
too much supports an inference that the use is in fact merely substitutional 
or otherwise illegitimate.271 
Second, access to materials used for transformative purposes should be 
restricted to students enrolled in the class, and the students’ access should 
be terminated once they have completed the course. This requirement is 
embodied in Principle One of the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for 
Academic and Research Libraries,272 and follows, in part, from the non-
substitution requirement described most recently in Authors Guild v. 
Google, Inc. Judge Leval explains in that case that even where a use has a 
transformative purpose and justification, its fairness may be undercut if the 
user makes available to the public an amount of the original work 
sufficient to serve as a market substitute.273 Limiting access to enrolled 
students ensures that the general public does not gain access to a 
substituting copy. 
A.   Orthogonal Teaching 
Although Netanel and Reese have shown that all transformative use 
involves use for new purposes,274 Samuelson’s distinction between 
“orthogonal” and “productive” uses275 is a helpful one. For one thing, 
orthogonal transformative uses can easily withstand challenges based on 
                                                                                                                          
269 See Netanel, supra note 24, at 745; Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2259–60.   
270 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1993) (stating that a fair 
user “must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of [an] original” to achieve a desired transformative 
purpose); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that, “[i]n any event, the law does 
not require that the secondary artist may take no more than is necessary”).  
271 See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that some passages from the Harry Potter novels reproduced in a follow-on “lexicon” were too 
lengthy to serve an explanatory purpose, and were likely used instead for their entertainment value); 
Leval, supra note 24, at 1123 (positing that the qualitative aspect of the amount of the original work 
taken may be more important under the third test than the quantitative amount of the original work 
appropriated). 
272 ASS’N OF RESEARCH LIBRARIES, supra note 143, at 14 (“Only eligible students and other 
qualified persons . . . should have access to materials . . . . The availability of materials should be 
coextensive with the duration of the course . . . .”). 
273 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 218 (2d Cir. 2015). 
274 Netanel, supra note 24, at 747; Reese, supra note 101, at 485.  
275 See Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2555–57 (positing that copyright law will be “more 
comprehensible and coherent” if orthogonal purposes are distinguished from productive purposes).  
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the amount taken and market harm, as completely novel purposes often 
require use of entire works, and such uses are by definition far outside the 
markets that rights holders “would in general develop or license others to 
develop.”276 Productive uses, on the other hand, are often made for 
purposes similar to the purposes of the original works, and must be more 
carefully tailored to avoid claims of excessive taking and market harm.277 
Many teaching uses of copyrighted material are for starkly different 
purposes than the authors’ or publishers’ originally intended purposes. 
Many such uses also involve creativity shifts (use of creative works for 
informative purposes and vice-versa), which Sag has shown to be highly 
predictive of a finding of fair use.278 A few orthogonal teaching uses can 
also be characterized as non-expressive, a category of transformative use 
that has consistently prevailed in fair use challenges. 
1.  Using Media About Current Events as Problems or Illustrations  
Connecting the themes or concepts of a class to current events can be a 
powerful pedagogical tool. When historical political rivalries are revived 
on the contemporary world stage,279 a controversy over planned alterations 
to a classic television show raises the specter of moral rights,280 or an 
extreme weather event reveals the potential consequences of ongoing 
environmental change,281 teachers of history, copyright law, and climate 
science, respectively, have an opportunity to bring their lessons to life. 
Whether teachers make the connection themselves as part of a lecture, task 
their students with identifying the connection as an exercise, or simply 
email a news story with a subject line explaining in brief the relevance to 
class, the news becomes subservient to the broader concepts of the 
classroom. Importing the news of the day into the classroom is therefore an 
orthogonal use. The stories are repurposed and recontextualized, made into 
                                                                                                                          
276 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1993). 
277 Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2569 (“The overwhelming majority of the productive use cases 
turn on whether the subsequent author took too much from a first author’s work or invaded a core 
licensing market.”). 
278 Sag, supra note 103, at 51. 
279 See, e.g., Alan Cowell & Stephen Castle, After Losing Scottish Independence Vote, Alex 
Salmond Will Resign, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/world/europe/ 
scotland-independence-vote-no.html?_r=0 (reporting on the resignation of the Scottish Minister after a 
contentious referendum for state sovereignty on which he had focused his political ambitions failed).    
280 See, e.g., Jason Kottke, The Wire, Remastered in HD, KOTTKE.ORG (Sept. 2, 2014), 
http://www.kottke.org/14/09/the-wire-remastered-in-hd [http://perma.cc/MV4U-7UH8] (discussing 
whether the adoption of a different aspect ratio in the remastered, high-definition version of a television 
show than that used in the original broadcasting interfered with the creator’s artistic intent). 
281 See, e.g., James Barron, After the Devastation, a Daunting Recovery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/us/hurricane-sandy-barrels-region-leaving-battered-path.ht 
ml?pagewanted=all (relating the extent of damage to the New York-metro area in the wake of 
Hurricane Sandy, which flooded beachfront communities and left Lower Manhattan and ninety percent 
of Long Island without electricity).  
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exemplars or problems rather than read for entertainment, and consumed in 
a distinct and specialized discursive community282 rather than as part of the 
general consuming public. In this context, use of an entire news story will 
often be appropriate to fully convey the lesson. 
2.  Teaching History with Primary Materials  
Teaching history and related subjects with primary historical 
documents, such as newspaper and magazine articles, advertisements, 
manifestoes, and even popular entertainment, is an orthogonal use of those 
materials and should be considered transformative. Use of entire works 
will often be appropriate here, as works will often need to be encountered 
in their entirety to convey a full understanding of a historical period. 
Analogies to case law abound. For example, just as the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations reproduced radio programs by Michael 
Savage as evidence of their claim that the program was bigoted,283 a 
professor of European history might share copies of F.T. Marinetti’s 
Futurist Manifesto (first published in the Italian newspaper Le Figaro) 
with students as evidence of the embrace of violence among certain parts 
of the Italian artistic and cultural scene in the years preceding the rise of 
fascism. Similarly, a course on the history of the American South might 
assign readings from contemporary news coverage of lynchings. In this 
context, materials are not encountered for aesthetic enjoyment, 
entertainment, information about the news of the day, or otherwise for their 
own sake, but rather as evidence or artifacts of the spirit of a different time. 
3.  Using Expressive Works to Teach Theories and Methods of Critical 
Thought and Analysis  
While some courses in film or literary studies take the works 
themselves as their primary subjects with the goal of acquainting students 
with classics or masterpieces in a given medium or movement,284 others 
aim primarily to teach critical theories and methods. These courses equip 
students to encounter new works with effective analytical tools relied on 
by professionals in their chosen field. Classes in theory will often take a 
                                                                                                                          
282 See Heymann, supra note 227, at 449 (using the concept of distinct discursive communities to 
help define transformative use). 
283 Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL 2951281, at 
*1–2 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008). 
284 So-called “great books” curricula sometimes take this approach. See, e.g., Curriculum, 
HARRISON MIDDLETON UNIV., http://www.hmu.edu/curriculum/ [http://perma.cc/J6N8-L4UA] (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“Students acquire knowledge from the wisdom of thirty centuries contained in 
the works by world famous authors in imaginative literature, natural science, philosophy and religion, 
and social science.”). A similar, but distinguishable, category of uses is described in Part IV.B.2., infra. 
Unlike the pure “great books” approach, productive uses take existing works as a starting point for 
discussion of larger themes, and are not necessarily committed to any judgment of the overall merit or 
social value of the works studied. 
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“text” as the raw material and subject it to analysis through the lens of 
several schools of thought or critical methods. Students learn facility with 
critical perspectives and modes of analysis by practicing their application 
to expressive works. When a teacher makes a work available to students so 
that it can be the subject of such an analysis, that use is orthogonal to the 
subject work’s original purposes, which are typically to entertain, inform, 
persuade, and so on. Such a use is arguably a “creativity shift” in Matthew 
Sag’s terminology,285 as the texts studied are often creative, while the 
analysis (orally in lecture and discussion, and in written assignments) is 
factual. 
Note that the works of critics or scholars describing the relevant 
methods or theories would not be used orthogonally when assigned as 
reading in this context. Reading Jacques Derrida in a class on literary 
theory, for example, will not be orthogonal to the original purpose of 
Derrida’s work. Rather, such works would be read for precisely the reason 
they were written, to facilitate comprehension of the theory or method at 
issue. 
4.  Teaching with Archival Materials 
Archives, which collect the artifacts of the daily lives of individuals, 
families, and institutions, are a rich source of raw material for teaching. 
From corporate records to family photos, archival materials tell stories that 
can enhance the teaching of any subject, from history to cultural 
anthropology to corporate law. While the materials in archives are created 
for a wide variety of purposes, none of them are created with the purpose 
of future use in teaching. Indeed, archival materials are generally not 
created with any commercial or expressive purpose of the kind copyright is 
meant to protect. Thus, use of these materials for teaching purposes will be 
susceptible to a strong transformative use rationale. More and more 
archives seek to make their collections available to the public, or at least to 
educational users, to facilitate such uses. 
5.  Teaching Skills and Methods with Exemplars of Good and Bad 
Practice  
One effective way to teach a craft or skill is to use an existing work as 
an example of good or bad practice, or as raw material for critical 
assessment of the work’s relative strengths and weaknesses. Persuasive 
writing, news reporting, cinematography, documentary filmmaking, and 
graphic design are all examples of subjects that could be taught at least in 
                                                                                                                          
285 Sag defines a “creativity shift” as any use “where the plaintiff’s work is creative and the 
defendant’s is informational, or vice versa,” explaining that “[t]his shift in category should almost 
always entail a fundamental change in purpose, which is the hallmark of transformative use.” Sag, 
supra note 103, at 58.   
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part by critical examination of exemplary works. In these cases, the works 
will have been created for orthogonal expressive purposes (to persuade, 
entertain, and so forth), so their use as models for teaching will be 
transformative. A creative writing class that attends to the inventive 
structure of a short story is not consuming the story for its original 
aesthetic purpose, but rather is using the story as a model of excellence (or 
of mediocrity or failure). A persuasive writing class that dissects an op-ed 
column to identify logical fallacies is not consuming the column as 
originally intended (one hopes), but is focused instead on aspects of the 
work the author likely hopes will evade his audience’s attention. Such uses 
are therefore very likely to be transformative and fair. 
6.  Teaching Technological Tools and Content Manipulation Skills 
Using Raw Material from Existing Works. 
The work of many creative disciplines involves assembling, editing, 
and manipulating existing expressive material to create a new finished 
product. Video editing, graphic design, music composition, web design, 
journalism, and visual art are all disciplines where students may need to 
learn methods and theories, technological tools, and other skills for 
creating new works built from existing materials. In the professional 
context, such uses may typically be licensed or made collaboratively with 
authors, e.g., a film editor employed by a film studio produces a final 
product from raw footage with the studio’s permission. The educational 
context may not afford students an opportunity to work in collaboration 
with the kinds of authors or rights-holding companies that will be part of 
the professional setting.286 In these cases, students may practice their skills 
using raw material available in the mass market. When students use 
existing creative works as inputs for learning these skills, they are 
engaging in an orthogonal transformative use, so long as the purpose is to 
learn methods and tools in the classroom, and the resulting work is used 
only in an educational context. Use of such works beyond the educational 
context may no longer constitute fair use.287 
                                                                                                                          
286 Some educators teach fair use and copyright as part of their courses on professional skills and 
insist that any work their students do should be publishable as a professional work product, i.e., that all 
class work should be done as if it were going to be published professionally, up to and including 
obtaining any permissions that a professional would have to obtain. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, 
MEDIA LITERACY EDUCATION, supra note 268, at 13 (discussing the importance of teaching students to 
make proper attributions of copyrighted materials and to make their own determinations of fair use). 
While this is a valid choice in many contexts, there are certainly teaching contexts where expecting 
students to meet such standards is too costly or otherwise impractical, and learning should not be 
impeded.  
287 This is not to say that any publication of works created in this way will cease to be fair use. 
Publication of class projects in online portfolios to show student skill and achievement in a given class 
or course of study, for example, is a legitimate extension of the classroom exercise and is itself an 
orthogonal use—its purpose is to advertise the student to would-be employers, graduate programs, and 
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B.  Productive Teaching 
Samuelson argues that courts consistently favor “productive” uses of 
existing works (or, more often, parts of works) to facilitate critical analysis 
or commentary by a subsequent author in a subsequent work of authorship, 
so long as the amount taken is appropriate and the use does not intrude on 
a relevant licensing market.288 Netanel and Reese have shown that creation 
of a new work is neither necessary nor sufficient for finding transformative 
use,289 so it makes sense to broaden the “productive use” category to 
include any use in which the primary purpose is criticism or commentary 
about the work itself, regardless of whether it results in the creation of a 
new work. This broadening is consistent with Leval’s original 
characterization of transformative uses as ones that involve “creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings,”290 
none of which require the literal creation of a new work.291 
Productive teaching can be distinguished from orthogonal teaching 
because productive uses involve teaching that is primarily about the works 
themselves, rather than using the works to teach about some other subject. 
While the works themselves may be the subjects of study, productive 
teaching uses the works to create new information, insights, and aesthetics, 
Leval’s hallmarks of transformative use. 
1.  Teaching Lectures with Third-Party Media 
Teachers add extensively to the expressive value of the materials they 
use in their lectures: they provide conceptual scaffolding so that students 
can better understand new material; they give social, historical, political, 
and artistic context that illuminates the objects of study; they bring their 
own critical perspectives to bear; and more. A good lecture is a carefully 
planned performance that weaves together disparate materials to serve a 
                                                                                                                          
the like, as well as to integrate learning. See, e.g., Scholarship, AUBURN UNIV. OFF. UNIV. WRITING, 
http://wp.auburn.edu/writing/eportfolio-project/faculty-support/scholarships/ [http://perma.cc/EQ5B-
JMUA] (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
288 Samuelson, supra note 114, at 2555–56 (discussing cases where the use of an original work to 
create a scholarly secondary work that does not harm the market for the original work has been held to 
be a fair use).  
289 See Netanel, supra note 24, at 748 (explaining that the “vast majority of courts adhere to the 
rule that new expressive content, even a fundamental reworking of the original, is generally insufficient 
for the use to be transformative absent a different expressive purpose” and that a “startling number of 
recent cases have held that the use was transformative when the defendant copied the plaintiff's work in 
its entirety without modification, but for a different expressive purpose”); Reese, supra note 101, at 494 
(noting that the creation of a derivative work does not necessarily constitute fair use, and that a 
secondary work does not have to alter the first work to be considered transformative).  
290 Leval, supra note 24, at 1111. 
291 That said, some productive teaching uses do involve the creation of new works of authorship, 
such as PowerPoint slides, video lectures, and the like; such uses will perhaps be even more likely to 
benefit from the generally favorable treatment of scholarly secondary works that Samuelson describes.  
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variety of learning goals, adding at least as much value to incorporated 
third-party material as any critical essay would, and warrants the same 
deferential treatment.292 Lectures that borrow from creative, fictional works 
in service of a factual presentation will constitute “creativity shifts.” 
This is one area where there is case law directly on point. In Sundeman 
v. Seajay Society293 the Fourth Circuit ruled that a scholar’s use of portions 
of an unpublished manuscript in the context of a lecture presentation was 
transformative.294 The scholar, Dr. Anne Blythe, had written a critical 
essay and given an oral presentation on a manuscript of an unpublished 
work called Blood of My Blood.295 The court reasoned that,  
A reading of Blythe’s paper clearly indicates that she 
attempted to shed light on Rawlings’ development as a young 
author, review the quality of Blood of My Blood, and 
comment on the relationship between Rawlings and her 
mother. The “further purpose” and “different character” of 
Blythe’s work make it transformative, rather than an attempt 
to merely supersede Blood of My Blood.296 
The Copyright Office has also recognized that use of film clips for 
educational purposes constitutes a fair use.297 It did so in the context of its 
triennial inquiry into what sorts of uses might be unduly burdened by the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s ban on circumvention of technical 
protection measures. DVDs are protected by a form of encryption that must 
be circumvented by teachers who wish to copy the digital video files to 
create a clip compilation for class. Because this circumvention would 
otherwise trigger DMCA liability, teachers have sought and received an 
exemption in several successive Copyright Office proceedings.298 The 
                                                                                                                          
292 Section 110 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012), permits performance and display of 
copyrighted works in the context of classroom teaching, but its protection is far from complete. For 
example, the creation of a compilation of film clips for teaching may itself be an act of infringement 
independent of the permitted in-class performance. Similarly, a set of PowerPoint slides reproducing 
entire works of fine art for use in an art history lecture could be an infringing derivative work. Also, the 
scope of § 110’s protection for teaching online and in other less traditional contexts is uncertain. 
Luckily, these uses should fall squarely within the category of productive transformative use. 
293 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).  
294 Id. at 202–03. 
295 Id. at 199. 
296 Id. at 202. 
297 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: FIFTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO 
DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 126–27, 129 (2012), 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2012/Section_1201_Rulemaking_2012_Recommendation.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/DD6A-9NRW].   
298 See generally Section 1201 Exemptions to Prohibition Against Circumvention of 
Technological Measures Protecting Copyrighted Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/ 
1201/ [http://perma.cc/2QZD-5HHU] (last visited Dec. 2, 2015) (collecting current and previous 
exemptions granted by the Copyright Office).  
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grant of an exemption from DMCA liability requires finding that the 
contemplated use is non-infringing.299 
2.  Teaching Themes, Genres, or Stylistic Movements in Music, Film, 
or Literature by Assigning Outside Reading of Exemplary Works 
Courses about music, film, or literature are often organized around 
themes, genres, or stylistic movements. The particular works studied in 
such courses are not necessarily as important as the characteristics they 
share, the trend they collectively illustrate, and so on. Teachers choose 
works for study in these courses for a variety of reasons, many of which 
will have little to do with the original intentions of the works’ creators or 
publishers.  
For example, one professor of comparative film might have his 
students stream the library’s copy of the 1933 film King Kong as part of a 
comparative film class about the depiction of Africa in American cinema, 
while another professor might assign the same film for a class on special 
effects, and a third for comparison and contrast with subsequent remakes. 
In each case the film is no longer consumed for its entertainment value (the 
original purpose of its creators), but is instead recontextualized, used by 
the teacher as evidence or illustration of a broader theme, style, or genre. A 
student’s purpose in watching the film, and therefore her experience of the 
film, will be different in each case, as she will attend to certain aspects of 
the film and ignore others as appropriate to the learning goals of the class. 
The film will in turn shape the way she understands the concepts and 
vocabulary she learns in class. The use will, accordingly, be highly 
productive, and highly transformative. 
Similarly, a professor of comparative literature might post the full text 
of Leroi Jones’s 1964 one-act play “Dutchman” to a course website for 
students in a course on black nationalism in American literature, or she 
might post the play for a course on symbolism in twentieth century drama, 
or she might use it to show the import and influence of Richard Wagner’s 
opera The Flying Dutchman, from which the play takes its name. Again, in 
each case the work is not read for its own sake, for entertainment, or for 
the dramatic provocation that its author intended, but rather as part of a 
broader construct chosen by the teacher. That construct will inform the 
student’s experience of the work, as the work will inform the student’s 
learning of the construct. Again, the use is highly productive and 
transformative. 
Such uses are productive because the teacher adds new insights and 
new meaning to each work, placing them into the new context created by 
                                                                                                                          
299 See id. at 102–03 (discussing DVD encryption technology and efforts to create an exemption 
from DMCA liability for teachers who copy DVD video files for educational purposes). 
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the unifying structure of the course. She can do so by placing the work into 
conversation with other works, with critics, with students, and with the 
teacher herself. She can also create conceptual scaffolding for students to 
use to surface meanings or qualities that are not apparent on the surface of 
the work, as appropriate to the course. Finally, a teacher can assign her 
students to make additional productive uses of the works by drawing their 
own critical conclusions, and perhaps embodying those conclusions in an 
essay, research paper, or other expressive work. Taken together, these 
kinds of activities are at the heart of what Leval describes as activities that 
serve the very purposes of copyright.300 
3.  Assembling Galleries, Playlists, and Other Large Collections of 
Representative Works to Facilitate Student Exposure to Genres, 
Movements, Styles, and Other Shared Characteristics of 
Expressive Works 
Sometimes, in addition to assigning particular works or parts of works 
for students to read and discuss, teachers assign students to browse and 
sample from a more expansive list of works that share a given 
characteristic in order to give students the opportunity to see relevant 
commonalities and differences for themselves. Collections of images of art 
from a particular historical period, or streaming audio of musical 
compositions in a particular style or genre, for example, can provide 
students with the raw material for a unique learning experience that 
combines interactivity, open-ended exploration, and self-guided inquiry. 
Selecting and arranging these collections can involve substantial 
intellectual investment from the teacher (or the library curator), and the 
insights that emerge from free exploration of a sufficiently rich collection 
will quickly outstrip the value of any particular work in isolation. 
Universities are already using art image galleries and streaming music 
collections in this way, and the transformative rationale is compelling. Like 
the Bloomberg subscriber in Swatch or the Grateful Dead aficionado in Bill 
Graham Archives, the student who browses a gallery of this kind has a 
completely different purpose, and a different kind of intellectual and 
aesthetic experience, than the original intended audience.  
V.  NON-TRANSFORMATIVE EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE 
It is tempting to see transformative use as not only the heart of the fair 
use doctrine, but the whole of it. While the tendency in the first two 
decades after 1976 was to over-emphasize market effect for teaching 
                                                                                                                          
300 See Leval, supra note 24, at 1107–10 for an elaborated discussion.  
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uses,301 the total elimination of market effect as a consideration in fair use 
decision-making would curtail valuable uses, including many educational 
ones. It is quite possible that Judge Evans got things basically right as 
regards GSU’s uses, i.e., that many of the excerpts at issue in the GSU case 
were not used in a transformative way, but were still used fairly given the 
importance of education and the negligible market value of access to 
electronic excerpts.302 Because the issue of transformative use was not 
litigated, we may never know. In any event, in reviving transformative use 
for education, teachers need not abandon market-centered arguments that 
may still be available to them. This is especially true given the courts’ 
more nuanced and balanced approach to market inquiry in the GSU case. 
The difference between a transformative use argument and a market-
centered argument could be characterized as the difference between 
“justification” and “excuse.”303 This is a point on which Wendy Gordon 
and Pierre Leval might agree. Judge Leval argues that “the answer to the 
question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the 
challenged use is transformative.”304 Transformative uses are justified 
because they serve the goals of copyright. Gordon argues that when uses 
are justified, we want others to emulate them; therefore, it is normatively 
right that such uses be conducted without payment or permission.305 When 
uses are excused, however, there is a sense of “if only”—if only 
circumstances were different, there would be no need for fair use.306 In 
excused cases, we might prefer that the ordinary system of seeking and 
paying for permission could operate, but we acknowledge that, for now, 
they cannot.307 HathiTrust and the GSU case show both the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of the market-centered, “excused” incarnation of 
fair use. 
Although the appellate decision in HathiTrust is a near-total 
endorsement of District Judge Baer’s ultimate conclusions about the 
                                                                                                                          
301 See id. at 1124 (discussing the tendency of the Supreme Court to over-emphasize the market 
effect). 
302 See Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1238–39 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (holding that GSU’s uses of 
copyrighted materials falls within the fair use exception), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th 
Cir. 2012).  
303 See Gordon, supra note 67, at 152–55 (characterizing various fair use exception arguments as 
being either justifications or excuses). 
304 Leval, supra note 24, at 1111. 
305 Gordon, supra note 67, at 160 (“[A] judge might well decide that a defendant could be justified 
in proceeding without consent or compensation: that even if market conditions were perfect, it would 
be normatively appropriate to proceed outside the market’s ordinary process of consent and payment.”). 
306 See id. at 152. (“‘Excuse’ connotes ‘if only’—if only some discrete fact were different, we 
could apply the law as written. In instances of ‘market malfunction’ . . . we would prefer the market to 
govern if only the market could function well, but when it fails to do so . . . a court may excuse a 
participant from adhering to the usual market rules.”). 
307 Id. 
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fairness of the uses at issue, it makes some important analytic distinctions 
that push back on the district court opinion. In particular, Judge Parker 
throws cold water on Judge Baer’s declaration that “I cannot imagine a 
definition of fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses 
made by Defendants’ [mass-digitization project] and would require that I 
terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and 
cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused 
by the ADA.”308 Although Judge Baer did not say that the value of the 
HathiTrust’s use is sufficient to make the use transformative, Judge Parker 
cautions that “[a]dded value or utility is not the test.”309 As described in 
Part II.C. above, Judge Parker goes on to apply the correct test for 
transformative use—did the use “serve[] a new and different function from 
the original work”310—and finds most of the HathiTrust’s uses to be 
transformative.311 
For one of the HathiTrust’s uses, however, the court finds that the use 
is non-transformative—but still fair.312 Some university members of the 
HathiTrust provide print-disabled patrons access to digitized versions of 
books from their collections,313 a revolutionary development that makes 
literally millions of works available for the first time to people that have 
endured a “book famine”314 for centuries due in part to publishers’ 
unwillingness to make books available in accessible formats. Judge Baer 
interpreted this widespread and systematic exclusion to mean that “the 
intended use of the original work” for purposes of transformative use 
                                                                                                                          
308 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 446, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).  
309 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 96.   
310 Id.  
311 See id. at 97. 
312 See id. at 101–02.  
313 See Accessibility, HATHITRUST DIGITAL LIBR., http://www.hathitrust.org/accessibility 
[http://perma.cc/PN6Z-QVZD] (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). At the time of the decision only the 
University of Michigan was providing this kind of access, but more HathiTrust partners are likely to do 
so now that the program has survived judicial scrutiny on appeal. 
314 See Jim Fruchterman, HathiTrust Victory Advances Accessibility, BOOKSHARE BLOG (July 31, 
2014), http://bookshareblog.wpengine.com/2014/07/haititrust-fairusevictory/ [http://perma.cc/8972-
X7B4] (predicting that the HathiTrust ruling would lead to greater access to books and text for the 
blind and print-disabled); Kartik Sawhney, Perspective: End the ‘Book Famine’ with Better 
Technology, Attitudes and Copyright Law, in STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2013: CHILDREN 
WITH DISABILITIES 82 (Abid Aslam ed., 2013), http://www.unicef.org/sowc2013/files/SWCR2013 
_ENG_Lo_res_24_Apr_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4K4-R7QX] (discussing the prevalence of “book 
famine[s]” throughout the developing world); Meredith Schwartz, HathiTrust Verdict Could Transform 
University Access for the Blind, LIBRARY J. (Nov. 7, 2012), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2012/11/ 
copyright/hathitrust-verdict-could-transform-university-access-for-the-blind/#_ [http://perma.cc/9GKE-
LF4V] (discussing the impact of the HathiTrust case on university services for the blind and print-
disabled).   
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analysis was “enjoyment and use by sighted persons.”315 Relative to that 
purpose, creating new formats that make the works accessible to an 
unintended audience is transformative, and Judge Baer so held. 
Judge Parker took a more expansive view of the purpose of the works, 
taking the plaintiffs at their word that they “write books to be read (or 
listened to),” without regard to audience.316 Because making accessible 
copies available to the general university community merely facilitates 
reading the books for any general purpose, the HathiTrust “appears, at first 
glance, to be creating derivative works over which the author ordinarily 
maintains control.”317 This is not a transformative use. In the ordinary case, 
the market should function so that authors (and their assignees) control and 
profit from the creation of derivative works that serve the same basic 
function as the protected work. Indeed, groups representing the print-
disabled have said repeatedly and in many contexts that they would prefer 
to be served by the ordinary market rather than rely on “charity” in the 
form of special programs that provide free services.318  
However, the court observes that providing accessible copies to the 
print-disabled is strongly favored by public policy, citing Supreme Court 
precedent, legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, and the variety of 
other laws favoring accommodation for the disabled.319 Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                                          
315 Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).      
316 HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 101. Not coincidentally, such an expansive definition of purpose 
threatens to shrink substantially the domain of transformative use. Even an excerpt reprinted in a book 
review is “read,” after all. In reality, it is the breadth of the HathiTrust’s purpose that was decisive here. 
Courts generally ask more probing questions about the secondary user’s purpose relative to the original 
intended purpose, but in this case the secondary use is intentionally broad: full text access for any 
purpose a print-disabled user might have, from scholarship to leisure, just as printed books are made 
available for any purpose to sighted library patrons. When courts do invoke new audiences in finding 
transformative use (in Swatch and Cariou, for example), it is generally as evidence for a novel purpose 
(objective financial reporting and high-end appropriation art, respectively). Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. 
v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 85–86 (2014); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2013). In the 
absence of a genuinely novel purpose, it makes more sense to frame the fair use inquiry in terms of 
market failure.  
317 Id. 
318 See, e.g., Marc Maurer, The Shoeshine, Blindness, and the NFB, BRAILLE MONITOR (Dec. 
1985), https://nfb.org/Images/nfb/Publications/bm/bm85/bm8512/bm851213.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
6CHP-U5Q2] (“I am sure that we will find a way for people to realize that blindness does not require 
free shoeshines and that equality requires the individual to pay for service given.”); Zach Shore, Free 
Rides for the Blind Cost Us Too Much, 33 BRAILLE MONITOR 30, 31 (1990), https://nfb.org/Images/ 
nfb/Publications/bm/bm90/brlm9003.htm [https://perma.cc/7W7G-GKP6] (“We can never hope to gain 
equal status in society if we are not willing to take on our financial obligations, and that means paying 
our fair share along with everybody else.”). Of course, libraries lend books for free to all patrons, so to 
exclude the print disabled based on market availability would not be equal treatment. 
319 See HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 102 (listing Supreme Court affirmations of the court’s reasoning, 
and legislative history, supporting the notion that “making copies accessible ‘for the use of blind 
persons’ posed a ‘special instance illustrating the application of the fair use doctrine’” (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73 (1976))).  
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court finds that the purpose is a favored one.320 Notably, the legislative 
history and the Supreme Court both proclaim that providing accessible 
works to the blind is fair use without any explicit reference to the market as 
a limiting factor. Nevertheless, the court finds that the fourth factor also 
favors the use given the near-total failure of the market to serve this 
audience relative to the HathiTrust’s ability to provide accessible copies of 
millions of books.321 The court does not condition its finding of fairness on 
the absence of a market option, nor does it advise the HathiTrust or its 
partners that future conduct may cease to be fair if market options come 
online.322 
Like Judge Parker, Judge Evans of the GSU case finds ample evidence 
that education is an activity strongly favored by public policy.323 Judge 
Evans relies primarily on the text of the fair use statute itself, but the 
legislative history,324 provisions elsewhere in the Copyright Act,325 case 
law, and related legislation all help to demonstrate the strong public policy 
of promoting access to education and educational materials. The amicus 
brief submitted by the American Council on Education and other higher 
education groups recounts at length the evidence that education is favored 
by policy.326 By itself, however, this finding would not be enough to justify 
a finding of fair use. Education is a major intended market for some 
authors and publishers; a blanket right to copy freely and distribute 
anything for educational purposes would cause that market to collapse, 
depriving teachers and students of useful resources created expressly for 
support of teaching.  
Judge Evans takes a vastly more fine-grained approach to the question 
of market effect for allegedly non-transformative uses. Unlike Judge 
Parker, she does not simply observe that despite the promises of licensing 
                                                                                                                          
320 Id. at 103.  
321 Id. At the same time, the court’s inquiry into the robustness of the market for accessible 
formats is cursory, barely more than a single paragraph of conclusory statements. Id. Judge Parker 
simply notes that authors often forego royalties from specialized formats and that relatively few books 
are available to lend in that format. See Marc Maurer, Historic Chance to End the Book Famine Must 
Not Be Lost, NAT’L FED’N BLIND (June 25, 2013, 8:35 PM), https://nfb.org/blog/vonb-blog/historic-
chance-end-book-famine-must-not-be-lost [https://perma.cc/PWG5-6MC7] (“Even in the United 
States, only 5 percent of all printed materials are estimated to be accessible to the blind and print 
disabled.”). 
322 The court does not explicitly condition its finding of fairness on the lack of a market option for 
the blind and print-disabled, although it does make reference to it. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d. at 103.     
323 See Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1224–25 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (referencing Supreme Court 
opinions suggesting that there is an exception to the transformative use requirement when the use is for 
educational purposes), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2012).  
324 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 66–68 (1976).   
325 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
326 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Council on Educ. et al. in Support of Appellees Mark 
P. Becker, et al., and Affirmance, Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (No. 08-cv-1425-ODE), 2013 
WL 1869772.  
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agents like the CCC,327 and the warnings of copyright scholars,328 licenses 
for digital educational use are not readily available for huge swaths of 
relatively mainstream content,329 much less for ephemera or out-of-print 
works. Instead, she goes work-by-work to ask whether in each particular 
instance unlicensed use for a favored purpose nevertheless had encroached 
unacceptably far on the market for the work.330 
Since we are now beyond the realm of transformative use, it is difficult 
to know on what basis we can say that Judge Evans’ granular approach is 
more or less reasonable than Judge Parker’s broad survey. The two 
activities—education and access for the disabled—do not have radically 
different bona fides as favored fair use purposes. If anything, teaching has 
the stronger claim given its presence in the preamble. In any event, the two 
cases show the unpredictability of a four-factor analysis featuring a 
strongly favored purpose that does not qualify as transformative. Whether 
the favored purpose will be given broad latitude or placed firmly at the 
mercy of the market may vary from judge to judge. Still, for many 
educational uses the market has indeed failed. Teachers and institutions 
should not be stymied by the dead ends they will often encounter when 
they look to license materials for non-transformative uses. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Educators have labored too long in the combined shadow of the 
coursepack cases, the Classroom Guidelines, and of the false dichotomy of 
Footnote Eleven of Campbell. It is perverse that a group that has been, 
more than any other community, the intended beneficiary of copyright and 
fair use, has nevertheless relegated itself to second-class status as a result 
of the perceived weight of such slim authorities. The two key paradigms in 
                                                                                                                          
327 See Annual Copyright License, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., https://www.copyright.com/ 
content/cc3/en/toolbar/productsAndSolutions/annualLicenseAcademic.html [http://perma.cc/G6KD-
DWBS] (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (“The Annual Copyright License provides the comprehensive 
coverage colleges and universities need to share information. With the Annual Copyright License, 
faculty, researchers and other staff members can collaborate freely, while respecting the intellectual 
property of others.”). 
328 See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.    
329 E.g., Cambridge I, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1212–16 (N.D. Ga. 2012), rev’d, Cambridge II, 769 
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2012). For example, only 12% of the works available for license as paper 
coursepacks through CCC were also available for license for electronic uses in 2008. Id. at 1213. 
Cambridge University Press withholds 40% of its catalog from CCC’s licensing services, both print 
and electronic. Id. Of the 9 million titles allegedly included in CCC’s blanket annual license program, 
only 17% allowed use of electronic excerpts. Id. at 1215. Cambridge does not participate in the blanket 
license, and Oxford University Press only includes its journals, not its monographs. Id. Librarians 
trying to assess the coverage of the CCC blanket license have been disappointed with the results. E.g., 
J. Christopher Holobar & Andrew Marshall, E-Reserves Permissions and the Copyright Clearance 
Center: Process, Efficiency, and Cost, 11 PORTAL: LIBR. & ACAD. 517, 518, 524, 527–29 (2011). 
330 For Judge Evans’ case-by-case analysis of each instance of unlicensed use, see Cambridge I, 
863 F. Supp. 2d at 1244–1361.     
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fair use thinking—market-centered and transformative use—have been 
misapplied and written off, respectively, leaving teachers and educational 
institutions too often to the tender mercies of publishers and licensors.  
I have tried to show some ways forward by revealing the forces behind 
this collective misapprehension and sketching the outlines of new ways of 
thinking about fair use in various educational contexts. The now-dominant 
paradigm of transformative use provides many exciting opportunities to 
unleash teaching from concerns about payment or permission. For uses that 
might not pass muster under the transformative use test, there remains 
substantial room to invoke market failure and favored purpose for a 
combined argument that can succeed just as the print-disabled community 
succeeded in HathiTrust. Teachers and educational institutions should 
make more and better use of these modes of thinking in support of their 
mission, and in support of the goal of the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution: “to Promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”331 
                                                                                                                          
331 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
